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“STRANGER THAN FICTION”:
TAXING VIRTUAL WORLDS
LEANDRA LEDERMAN*
Virtual worlds are increasing in commercial importance.  As the economic value of
computer-generated spaces soars, questions of how to apply our tax law to transac-
tions within them will inevitably arise.  In this Article, Professor Leandra
Lederman argues for federal income tax treatment that reflects the differences
between “game worlds” and “unscripted worlds,” arguing that the former should
receive more favorable tax treatment than the latter.  Specifically, she argues that
transactions in game worlds such as World of Warcraft should not be taxed unless
the player engages in a real-market sale or exchange.  By contrast, in intentionally
commodified virtual worlds such as Second Life, federal income tax law and policy
counsel that in-world sales of virtual items be taxed regardless of whether the par-
ticipant ever cashes out.
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INTRODUCTION
Space was once the “final frontier”; today, the newest worlds
exist in cyberspace.  These “virtual worlds” change, in real time, as
computer-rendered characters, or “avatars,”1 move through them.
Many offer elaborate and detailed graphics and allow thousands of
people worldwide to participate simultaneously, all interacting via the
internet with each other and the environment.  Some of these worlds,
such as City of Heroes, Everquest, and World of Warcraft (WoW), are
games that provide structured adventures involving quests, raids, and
fights against opposing forces.  Others, such as Second Life, The Sims
Online, and There, are unscripted virtual environments that lack a set
storyline.  In Second Life, for example, the world’s owner, Linden
Lab, provides the basic environment, but users create the vast
majority of the world’s content.2
1 “Representational proxies in these virtual spaces are known as ‘avatars,’ a word of
Hindu religious origin.”  F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual
Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) (citing Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies 6
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 752, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=338500).  “In 1985, F. Randall Farmer and Chip Morningstar developed Habitat,
the first multi-user domain with a visual 2D interface, and they chose avatar as the term for
the cartoons that users would drive around the virtual world.”  Castronova, supra, at 6.
The term was “later popularized by Neal Stephenson in his 1992 novel Snow Crash.”
Lastowka & Hunter, supra, at 6 n.10.
2 Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage:  User Created Content and Building the
Metaverse, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 87 (2004) (“Well over 99% of the objects in Second
Life are user created . . . .”).
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The population of virtual worlds is vast, numbering in the mil-
lions.3  Virtual worlds, particularly unscripted worlds such as Second
Life, provide a platform for all sorts of real world activity.  Second
Life has attracted substantial investment,4 and numerous real world
companies are using it to promote their products.5  For example, in
early 2007, Mazda debuted the Hakaze, a concept car, in Second Life,
prior to its real world debut.6
People generally pay to participate in virtual worlds,7 and many
are there solely for the social and entertainment value.8  However,
even in the course of playing structured games, participants often
receive items, such as armor, weapons, or virtual currency, that have
value within the game.  Some participants accept real money9 in
return for transferring such an item in-world.  As a result of such real-
market trades, many items have ascertainable market values.  Some of
those values are quite high.10  For example, “[l]evel 60 EverQuest
3 See Andrew Jankowich, EULAw:  The Complex Web of Corporate Rule-Making in
Virtual Worlds, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 4 (2006) (“Virtual worlds are becoming
increasingly popular; by January 2005, the number of ‘active subscriptions’ to virtual
worlds totaled more than 5,000,000, having grown from approximately 1,000,000 sub-
scribers in January 2002.”).   A single user can subscribe to more than one world, meaning
these figures somewhat overestimate the total number of people actively participating in
virtual worlds.
4 “The San Francisco company has garnered $19 million in funding.  Investors include
Globespan Capital Partners, Amazon.com founder Jeff Bezos, Lotus founder Mitch Kapor,
eBay founder Pierre Omidyar’s Omidyar Network and Catamount Ventures.”  Patrick
Cain, Companies Are Finding Second Life, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY (L.A.), Feb. 22, 2007,
at A4.
5 One article reports:
IBM has now acquired 24 Second Life “islands.”  That’s the most of anyone,
but plenty of other big companies—and many smaller ones—have a presence
in Second Life.  They include General Motors, Toyota Motor, Dell, Cisco Sys-
tems, Sun Microsystems and Reuters Group. . . . Businesses are using the
online world to advertise, test products and market ideas.  They also might
make some sales, mostly by linking Second Life visitors to their real world e-
commerce Web sites.
Id.
6 Scarlett Qi, Mazda Debut Falls Flat, SLNN.COM, Feb. 15, 2007, http://slnn.com/
article/hakaze-scarlett.
7 Most virtual worlds require users to pay a monthly subscription fee.  Jankowich,
supra note 3, at 54 (presenting results of survey that found that 83.33% of virtual worlds
charge fee).
8 See Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness:  What the Imaginary Asks of the Real, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19, 30 (2004) (“Many people play virtual worlds as a way to explore
their identity.”).
9 In this Article, the phrase “real money” refers to nonvirtual currency (such as the
U.S. dollar), and the phrase “real-market trades” refers to transactions that involve real
money or other real world consideration.
10 See, e.g., Julian Dibbell, Dragon Slayers or Tax Evaders?, LEGAL AFF., Feb. 2006, at
47, 47, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/feature_
dibbell_janfeb06.msp (“[O]n online marketplaces like eBay today, you will find a thriving,
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characters reportedly have sold for as much as $5,000 USD.”11  Some
people make a living playing the games, using their online personae to
obtain virtual items that have real value and then selling them, typi-
cally via online auction sites.12
Although it seems intuitive that a person who auctions virtual
property online for a living should be taxed on his or her earnings, or
even that a player who occasionally sells a valuable item for real
money should be taxed on the profits, what of a player who only
accumulates items or virtual currency within a virtual world?  Should
someone whose avatar discovers or wins an item of value be taxed on
the value of that item?  And should a player who trades a virtual item
in-game with another player (for another item or virtual currency) be
taxed on any increase in value of the item relinquished?13
multimillion-dollar market in Golden Runic Hammers, Ethereal Mounts, and similarly
exotic items[,] . . . many of them fetching prices in the hundreds, even thousands of dol-
lars.”); see also Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1062 (2005)
(reporting estimate of secondary market in virtual items of over $880 million, including one
virtual environment with greater net worth than Bulgaria and higher per capita GNP than
India or China).
11 Virtual Economy, in WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Virtual_
economy%title=virtual_economy&oldid=134671383 (version from May 30, 2007).  A study
in early 2007 found “an overall average cost of $259.52 per 1000 gold on the American
servers” of World of Warcraft (WoW).  WoW Gold Price Research:  A World of Warcraft
Economic Study, http://www.gamerprice.com/wow-gold-study.html (last visited Aug. 19,
2007).
12 See JULIAN DIBBELL, PLAY MONEY:  OR, HOW I QUIT MY DAY JOB AND MADE
MILLIONS TRADING VIRTUAL LOOT 18–20 (2006) (describing workings of “gold farm”
operated out of Mexico).  Many of the workers are actually employed by others who do
the selling and keep the profits. See Tim Johnson, For Millions of Chinese, Playing Com-
puter Games Is a Livelihood, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS (Wash., D.C.), July 19,
2006, at 1 (“Savvy entrepreneurs harness teams to play popular online games, gathering
magic spells, battle hammers, armor and other virtual assets.  They then provide the assets
to brokers, who sell them to rich players in the United States and Europe wanting short-
cuts to gaming success.”).  “Gold farmers” are those who work to acquire these items for
sale. Farmer (gaming), in WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farmer_(gaming) (last
visited Aug. 17, 2007) (“Farmer is a general term for an MMORPG [massive multiplayer
online role-playing game] player who attempts to acquire (‘farm’) items of value within a
game . . . .”).
A WoW subscriber has filed a class action lawsuit against Internet Gaming Entertain-
ment, Ltd. (IGE), alleging that “IGE’s gold farming activities not only substantially
diminish the enjoyment and satisfaction consumers obtain by earning, through the expen-
diture of vast amounts of time and energy, virtual assets within World of Warcraft, they
also violate the express terms of agreements Subscribers enter into to participate in World
of Warcraft.”  Complaint at 2, Hernandez v. Internet Gaming Entm’t, Ltd., No. 03-3674
(S.D. Fla. May 31, 2007), 2007 WL 1799038.
13 The federal income tax law generally taxes a taxpayer selling or exchanging property
on the difference between the fair market value of the property the taxpayer receives (plus
any money received) and the basis of the property the taxpayer relinquishes.  I.R.C.
§ 1001(a)–(c) (West 2006).
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These are important questions given the tax revenues at stake.
Although the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not yet attempted
to tax transactions within virtual worlds, officials are aware of the
issue.14  Moreover, given that the economies of some virtual worlds
are comparable to those of some countries, there is pressure on the
government to determine how to treat this industry.15  Congress’s
Joint Economic Committee has announced that it is studying the
issue.16
Most people’s intuition probably is that accumulation of assets
within a virtual world, for purposes of a mere “game,” should not be
taxed so long as the assets are not cashed out for real funds.17  Yet, at
least at first blush, analysis of federal income tax law suggests that
transactions within virtual worlds may be taxable.  Prizes and awards
from contests (including games), as well as windfalls such as lottery
winnings, are subject to federal income tax.18  The same is true of
profits on barter transactions, even with respect to barter of personal
use items.19  Is the common intuition therefore incorrect?
This Article analyzes how, and if, these transactions should be
taxed.20  Part I of the Article provides context, describing two types of
virtual worlds:  (1) massive multiplayer online role-playing games
(MMORPGs) (referred to in this Article as “game worlds”), such as
14 Dibbell, supra note 10, at 49 (describing his discussions with Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) on how to tax in-game trades, culminating in official remarking that issue is “so
weird”).
15 See Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds:  A First-Hand Account of Market and
Society on the Cyberian Frontier 1 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 618, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294828 (“The nominal hourly wage [of
Norrath, the world in the game Everquest] is about USD 3.42 per hour, and the labors of
the people produce a GNP per capita somewhere between that of Russia and Bulgaria.”);
see also Dustin Stamper, Taxing Ones and Zeros:  Can the IRS Ignore Virtual Economies?,
114 TAX NOTES 149, 149 (2007) (“The rise in massive multiplayer online games may pre-
sent the IRS with its thorniest pop culture tax issue since Mark McGwire was pelting mil-
lion-dollar home-run balls at baseball fans—only with much broader consequences.”).
16 Adam Reuters, US Congress Launches Probe into Virtual Economies, REUTERS, Oct.
15, 2006, http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2006/10/15/us-congress-launchs-probe-into-
virtual-economies.
17 This argument is made in, for example, Bryan Camp, The Play’s the Thing:  A Theory
of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=980693.
18 I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 74 (West 2006).
19 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (including “[g]ains derived from dealings in property” in gross
income); I.R.C. § 1001(a)–(c) (West 2006) (providing for calculation and presumptive rec-
ognition of gain); see also Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60, 60–61 (holding, in part, that
value of “rent-free use of an apartment” received in barter transaction is gross income).
20 This Article addresses the federal income tax consequences to those virtual world
participants who are U.S. citizens and residents of a variety of common transactions within
scripted games and unscripted worlds.  There are a variety of additional tax questions with
respect to virtual worlds that are beyond the scope of this Article.
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WoW, and (2) less structured virtual environments (referred to in this
Article as “unscripted worlds”), such as Second Life.21  It also dis-
cusses why real-market trading in virtual items has developed.
Part II of the Article considers whether virtual items are partici-
pants’ property for purposes of the federal income tax, which affects
both the taxation of “loot” items received in game worlds and the
taxation of in-game exchanges with other participants.  Property char-
acterization for federal income tax purposes depends on the rights
granted by applicable state law.  Currently, it is uncertain what prop-
erty rights participants in virtual worlds have in their items and ava-
tars, in part because it is not clear whether courts will uphold
provisions in agreements between game owners and players that pur-
port to deny players rights in virtual property.
In Part III, the Article turns to the intriguing federal income tax
questions that virtual worlds present, both as a matter of doctrine and
policy.  This Part discusses the taxation of both (1) virtual loot
received in game worlds and (2) exchanges in both game worlds and
unscripted worlds.  It explains where these transactions fit within
existing tax rules, as well as the results that tax policy concerns
counsel.
The Article concludes that transactions in game worlds, such as
WoW, should not be taxed unless the player engages in a real-market
trade (a cash-out rule)—a result strongly suggested by tax policy.  The
Article further concludes that in intentionally commodified virtual
worlds, such as Second Life, federal income tax law and policy counsel
that in-world sales of virtual items be taxed regardless of whether the
participant ever cashes out.  This approach would protect most con-
sumption in virtual worlds from “double taxation”22 while properly
imposing tax on commerce.
I
VIRTUAL WORLDS
A. The Experience
People participate in virtual worlds through their avatars, which
are visual representations of characters in those worlds.  An avatar
may look like a person, animal, mythical creature, or any other repre-
sentation that the software allows.  A virtual world’s “interface . . .
simulates a first-person physical environment on [the user’s] computer
screen; the environment is generally ruled by the natural laws of Earth
21 See Stamper, supra note 15, at 149 (“An online universe such as Second Life is
unstructured.  Its maker, Linden Lab, does not consider it a game at all.”).
22 See infra notes 201–02 and accompanying text.
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and is characterized by scarcity of resources.”23  Just as in the real
world, life is persistent and interdependent.  One article explains that,
as “you sleep in real life, other people’s representations may be eating
and dancing in your home in Blazing Falls; . . . virtual weddings will
take place while you chat at the physical world water cooler; and new
social structures will emerge while you have dinner.”24
Many virtual worlds are not mere spaces to explore but rather are
games complete with objectives and storylines fit for the setting.  Pro-
fessor Richard Bartle describes these kinds of worlds as providing “an
experience amounting to a hero’s journey.”25  That journey typically
entails participating in quests and raids, confronting enemies, and
gaining experience and accomplishment in the game.26  For example,
WoW, “the most popular [MMORPG] in the United States,”27
describes itself as follows:
World of Warcraft is an online role-playing experience . . . . Players
assume the roles of Warcraft heroes as they explore, adventure, and
quest across a vast world. . . . Whether adventuring together or
fighting against each other in epic battles, players will form friend-
ships, forge alliances, and compete with enemies for power and
glory.28
A virtual world need not have such structured content, how-
ever.29  A world’s creator can simply provide a virtual environment
and basic avatars along with tools to create items, allowing partici-
23 Castronova, supra note 15, at 6.
24 Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 1, at 6; see also Castronova, supra note 15, at 6
(“[T]he program continues to run whether anyone is using it or not; it remembers the
location of people and things, as well as the ownership of objects.”).
25 Bartle, supra note 8, at 30.
26 Julian Dibbell describes the experience, in part, as “engag[ing] in a quest.  You take a
character into a virtual world to hunt monsters, seek treasure, and enjoy the thrill of slowly
rising from humble beginnings to imaginary wealth and stature.”  Dibbell, supra note 10, at
47; see also Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 1, at 27 (“[T]he clear goal in each [game] is to
become a more powerful avatar.”).
27 Nicolas Ducheneaut et al., “Alone Together?”  Exploring the Social Dynamics of
Massively Multiplayer Online Games, 1 ASS’N FOR COMPUTER MACH. CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 407, 407 (2006), available at http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/1124772.1124834.
28 Introduction to World of Warcraft, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/beginners/
index.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2007).  City of Heroes explains that it is “the online world
that’s home to an entire universe of heroes, where you and thousands of other players take
on the roles of super powered heroes—in a stunning, 3D graphical world.”  City of Heroes
Community City, Game Info:  Game Synopsis, http://www.cityofheroes.com/gameinfo/
synopsis.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2007).
29 See Bartle, supra note 8, at 41 (“Virtual worlds are just about the only places where
an average person today can undertake a hero’s journey, but even without this feature they
can still qualify as virtual worlds (in the same way that a story without a plot can still be a
story).”); Camp, supra note 17, at 3 (“[A]n unstructured game has few rules, no objectives,
and no pre-set roles.”).
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pants to undertake virtual activities such as attending a concert, shop-
ping, building a house, or making and selling items useful in the
world.30  “In this [type of world], users create virtual lives by building
houses, publishing newsletters, and creating alter-egos.  They spend
hours upon hours creating their existence.”31
Second Life, which has over 10 million “residents,”32 is an
example of such an unscripted environment.  Linden Lab, its creator,
describes Second Life as “a 3-D virtual world entirely created by its
Residents. . . . Because Residents retain the rights to their digital cre-
ations, they can buy, sell and trade with other Residents.”33
B. Why Buy Items for Use In-World?
Virtual worlds are not all identically situated with respect to the
role of real-market trading.  Most game worlds, which have scripted
content, ban such trade, preferring players to earn game items solely
through in-game methods.34  Other virtual worlds encourage such
commerce.  For example, the owners of Entropia Universe earn their
revenues by selling virtual items to participants.  Those items deterio-
rate regularly and the user must pay real currency to replenish them.35
This Section discusses the motivations that participants in game
worlds and unscripted virtual environments have for using real money
to purchase virtual items.
30 See, e.g., Posting of Forseti Svarog to Slog:  A Second Life Resident Blog, http://
secondslog.blogspot.com/2006/06/understanding-sl-two-takes.html (June 12, 2006, 22:29)
(“While many people use [Second Life] for entertainment, and while you can build games
on top of the technology, Second Life is not in-and-of-itself a game.  Most consumers use it
as a place to socialize, play, experiment, doodle creatively, and shop.”).
31 Daniel C. Miller, Note, Determining Ownership in Virtual Worlds:  Copyright and
License Agreements, 22 REV. LITIG. 435, 436–37 (2003).
32 Second Life Frequently Asked Questions, http://secondlife.com/whatis/faq.php (last
visited Oct. 18, 2007) (showing 10,076,969 total “residents”).  Second Life participants are
commonly referred to as “residents.” See Second Life Home Page, http://secondlife.com/
(last visited Oct. 18, 2007) (“Second Life is a 3D online digital world imagined and created
by its residents.”).
33 Second Life, What Is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis (last visited Oct. 18,
2007).
34 See infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
35 See About Entropia Universe, http://www.mindark.com/about_PE_e.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 11, 2007) (“When these assets become worn and repair or replacement is
required, the user pays more money.”).  Entropia Universe is not truly a game world
because it “is open-ended and there is no fixed objective.”  Entropia Universe, http://
uvvy.com/index.php/Entropia_Universe (last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
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1. Game Worlds
Game worlds are typically about the experience of advancing and
completing various objectives that comprise the “hero’s journey.”36
Such a journey requires a character to obtain certain items, such as
weapons and protective armor, in order to succeed and attain higher
levels37 as the content becomes progressively more challenging.38
Low-value items can often be found by exploring the environment,
but higher value “loot” is typically earned by killing a computer-
generated character, such as a monster, which then drops its loot.39
Given that the journey is supposed to be part of the game, it may
seem counterintuitive to want to purchase an advanced character or a
useful or rare item:  Why buy items if part of the fun is earning them?
Players purchase items mainly because of the large time cost that
earning them entails.40  Acquiring powerful items and the experience
necessary for advanced quests may require many hours of game play
over many months.41  To advance a low-level avatar requires the com-
pletion of basic quests, as well as “grinding,”42 which most find much
36 Bartle, supra note 8, at 30 n.29 (“In virtual worlds, the undertaking of a hero’s
journey is, for many players, the ultimate source of the fun they derive from playing.”).
37 A character’s level typically reflects its “experience points” earned in the game.
Experience Point, in WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Level_up (last visited Aug.
20, 2007).  As Professor Castronova explains, “[i]n most [virtual worlds], capital is given by
a number called the ‘level,’ so that an avatar at level 6 who kills 100 kobolds is given an
increase to level 7.”  Castronova, supra note 15, at 14.  In WoW, for example, characters
start at level 1 and can achieve (at the time of this writing) a maximum level of 70. World
of Warcraft, in WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_of_Warcraft (last visited
Aug. 20, 2007).  Such level maxima may be adjusted as a game ages and more of its popula-
tion reaches the previous cap.
38 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 1, at 32 (“Visiting Norrath’s visually stunning
astral ‘Planes of Power’ . . .  is beyond the ability of most of the game’s avatars.  The
arduous processes involved in reaching and surviving in these environments effectively
make them exclusive clubs for the high-level avatar jet set.”).
39 This type of computer-generated character is referred to as a “MOB,” which is a
contraction of “mobile object.” See Mob (computer gaming), in WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mob_(computer_gaming) (last visited Aug. 20, 2007).
40 See Ondrejka, supra note 2, at 97 (“[T]ime-constrained users can make the rational
economic decision to use real world currency to advance their character . . . .  It is debat-
able whether or not this is fun, but it certainly has the effect of allowing users to bypass the
game designers’ wishes about game pacing, advancement, and progress.”).
41 See Castronova, supra note 15, at 14 (“[D]eveloping the avatar’s skills takes time;
monsters must be killed, axes must be forged, quests must be completed.  The result . . . can
take hundreds of hours . . . .”).
42 See Theodore J. Westbrook, Comment, Owned:  Finding a Place for Virtual World
Property Rights, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 779, 792 (“MMORPG users may spend hundreds
or even thousands of hours developing avatar attributes (usually through a time-consuming
‘leveling’ or ‘grinding’ process) . . . .”).
This aspect of MMORPGs was spoofed on an episode of South Park.  In order to
reach a level high enough to compete with a particularly powerful WoW player, Cartman
calculates that he and his friends will need to kill 65,340,285 computer-generated boars,
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less interesting than the content available to high-level avatars.  Many
players invest the necessary time; others, who have little time for
entertainment but money to spend—or who want to expedite
advancement so as to be able to participate in raids with more accom-
plished friends43—might prefer to purchase a needed item, a high-
level avatar, or even another player’s entire account containing
avatars and items.44  One article explains:
By analogy, consider the choice faced by an American in search of
an Indonesian mask or South African Zulu basket.  True, she could
travel to those places, study the art of making masks and baskets,
and after years of toil produce her heart’s desire with her own
hands.  Most people would regard this as insanity.  Why not just buy
one on eBay?45
As a result of this real world market for virtual items, some par-
ticipants even buy such items as an investment.46  Of course, one of
the risks for all players is the possibility that the virtual world will
cease to exist, eliminating all of that world’s content.47  Nonetheless,
“[w]hich should take us seven weeks five days thirteen hours and twenty minutes, giving
ourselves three hours a night to sleep.” South Park:  Make Love, Not Warcraft (Comedy
Central television broadcast Oct. 4, 2006), available at http://www.spscriptorium.com/
Season10/E1008script.htm.
43 Professor Bartle lists “group-play reasons” and status inflation among his “four main
reasons why people buy characters in virtual worlds.” Thus, players may make these
purchases when “their friends are ahead to an extent that they could not easily catch up.
They buy a character of an appropriate level so they can play with their friends again.”
Bartle, supra note 8, at 39–40.  He typifies the latter motivation as “the situation where a
player wants access to high-level content without having to ‘waste time’ playing through
the low-level content to get there.” Id. at 40 n.45.
44 Game owners can make items, such as particularly valuable items, “bind” to the
avatar that picks them up or uses them, making it impossible to trade the item.  That moves
trade to the level of the avatar.  A typical way of acquiring an avatar is to acquire another
player’s account containing that avatar. See Stamper, supra note 15, at 150 (“[Most]
internet sales now consist of the sale of whole accounts containing any avatars that have
acquired valuable items.”).
45 Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 1, at 38.  When a virtual item is purchased, the buyer
pays for the purchase using a mechanism such as PayPal, and the buyer and seller arrange
to meet in the game, where the seller will transfer the item to the buyer. Id.  eBay no
longer allows auctions for virtual items, except for Second Life items.  Daniel Terdiman,
eBay To Exempt ‘Second Life’ Listings from Virtual Items Ban, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 29,
2007, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-6154277-7.html.  However, alternative auction
sites exist.  For example, “PlayerAuctions, a site that grew as a result of eBay’s ban on
EverQuest items, boasts over 100,000 members.”  Ondrejka, supra note 2, at 99.
46 Bartle, supra note 8, at 39.
47 See James Grimmelmann, Virtual Worlds as Comparative Law, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 147, 175 (2004) (“As well-meaning as designers may be towards their game communi-
ties, as long as there are any designers, someone will have the power to pull the plug.”).
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as evinced by their purchases of virtual items, players seem willing to
gamble on the continued existence of virtual worlds.48
2. Unscripted Worlds
Like game worlds, unscripted worlds offer participants an implicit
or explicit choice to invest either time or money in equipping their
avatars.  Although worlds without set storylines typically do not pro-
vide participants with particular goals, they allow users to engage in
online activities such as chatting with friends, attending a concert, or
going to a nightclub.  Acquisitions can include such things as virtual
residences, virtual wardrobes, and virtual cars.  Providing a rich realm
and desirable trappings for one’s avatar can both be fun and increase
the participant’s status within the virtual world.
Some worlds, such as Second Life, intentionally provide for com-
merce.49  Second Life has garnered particular attention, in part
because its Terms of Service Agreement expressly states that partici-
pants retain any intellectual property rights they may have in their
creations.50  Allowing participants to retain their intellectual property
rights encourages creativity and entrepreneurial activity.  Second Life
also permits and facilitates exchanges of its currency, Linden dollars
(Lindens), for U.S. dollars.51  Second Life is thus an intentionally com-
modified world.52
48 Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty:  Freedom To Design and Freedom To Play in
Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2071 (2004) (“If virtual items have real-world
equivalent values . . . the game designer may be destroying a considerable amount of value
by turning off the game, and the more value that is destroyed, the less likely the law will
stand for it.”).
49 See Second Life, What Is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis (last visited
Aug. 18, 2007) (“The Marketplace currently supports millions of US dollars in monthly
transactions.  This commerce is handled with the in-world unit-of-trade, the Linden dollar,
which can be converted to US dollars at several thriving online Linden Dollar
exchanges.”).
50 Second Life’s Terms of Service Agreement (TOS) states, in part:
You retain copyright and other intellectual property rights with respect to Con-
tent you create in Second Life, to the extent that you have such rights under
applicable law.  However, you must make certain representations and warran-
ties, and provide certain license rights, forbearances[,] and indemnification, to
Linden Lab and to other users of Second Life.
Second Life, Terms of Service Agreement § 3.2, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php
(last visited Mar. 9, 2007).  The TOS grants Linden Lab a “perpetual, irrevocable, non-
exclusive right and license” in those creations. Id.
51 See id. § 1.5 (“Second Life offers an exchange, called LindeX, for the trading of
Linden Dollars, which uses the terms ‘buy’ and ‘sell’ to indicate the transfer of license
rights to use Linden Dollars.  Use and regulation of LindeX is at Linden Lab’s sole
discretion.”).
52 See Bartle, supra note 8, at 34 n.36 (“Commodification is a term used to describe the
transformation of previously non-commercial relationships into commercial relationships.
In virtual worlds, this is generally taken to refer to the treatment of virtual objects (or
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II
THE STATUS OF VIRTUAL PROPERTY
Do virtual items constitute property?  If so, who owns that prop-
erty?  These questions, as yet unresolved, are of critical importance
for virtual worlds.53  Most importantly for this Article, the answers to
these questions affect the analysis of the tax consequences of in-world
exchanges of goods.  For example, the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
provides that “[g]ains derived from dealings in property” constitute
income.54  Because federal income tax law generally looks to state law
rights to determine what constitutes property,55 this Part analyzes the
issue of what rights courts might find that participants have in virtual
property.  Because there is already a rich literature on this topic, the
discussion in this Part serves primarily to provide background infor-
mation relevant to the tax issues discussed in Part III.
A. What Is Virtual Property?
Although virtual items are rendered only on screen, computer
code enables them to resemble real chattels in their “rivalrousness,
persistence, and interconnectivity.”56  That is, “[i]f I hold a pen, I have
it and you don’t. . . . If I put the pen down and leave the room, it is still
there. . . . And finally, you can all interact with the pen . . . .”57  Cur-
rent technology allows virtual items to mimic these features.58  For
example, if my avatar holds a particular pair of boots, no one else’s
currency or characters) as objects of real world commerce.”); see also Jack M. Balkin, Law
and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 79–80 (2004) (discussing com-
modification of virtual worlds).
53 See Andrew E. Jankowich, Property and Democracy in Virtual Worlds, 11 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 173, 180 (2005) (“The question of property is an unsettled one in virtual
worlds. . . .  This virtual world property is extensive.”); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 1,
at 72 (“Property interests will be the initial arena for the development of virtual-world
law.”).
54 I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (West 2006).
55 See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278–79 (2002) (“State law determines only
which sticks are in a person’s bundle.  Whether those sticks qualify as ‘property’ for pur-
poses of the federal tax lien statute is a question of federal law.”); Morgan v. Comm’r, 309
U.S. 78, 80 (1940) (“State law creates legal interests and rights.  The federal revenue acts
designate what interests or rights, so created, shall be taxed.”).
56 Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1053; see also Westbrook, supra note 42, at 782 (“It is the
exclusive, or ‘rivalrous,’ nature of virtual property that gives it its unique similarity to real
world personal property.”).
57 Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1054.
58 Virtual property did not always have the persistence it does today. See Bartle, supra
note 8, at 42 (“Early virtual worlds . . . would periodically reset—everything was returned
to its starting position, leaving only the character records of the players untouched.  This
was for design reasons . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  Players’ expectations reflected that
reality:  “[O]ne consequence was that players took it for granted that everything in the
virtual world was transitory—the lord giveth and the lord taketh away.”  Id.
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avatar holds that copy.59  If I leave the room, go offline, or even turn
off my computer, the boots are still there.  Moreover, others in the
virtual world can see and interact with the boots.60  Consequently, sev-
eral scholars have called for treating virtual items that resemble real
world property the same way real world property is treated.61
Intellectual property law already recognizes a distinction between
an idea and its instantiation.  For example, rights that I have in a copy
of the movie The Matrix on DVD are distinct from the underlying
copyright on the movie.62  Even though I can give away my DVD,
donate it to charity, or even sell it, Warner Brothers retains the copy-
right on the movie.63  Professor Joshua Fairfield has advanced a sim-
ilar conceptual division for virtual items, distinguishing copies of a
virtual item in the game world from the copyright on that item.64
59 Other avatars may have copies of the same boots, in much the same way that many
people may have copies of the same pen.
60 Game owners may choose to write the code to restrict my ability to transfer the
boots to another avatar, however. See Stamper, supra note 15, at 150 (explaining that
game owners have tried to thwart real-money trade by binding most valuable items to
avatars).
61 See Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1048 (“Should computer code that is designed to act
like real world property be regulated and protected like real world property?  This article
contends that it should.”); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 1, at 72 (“[I]t seems clear that
virtual assets can be characterized as property for the purposes of real world law.”); see
also Charles Blazer, Note, The Five Indicia of Virtual Property, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 137, 161
(2006) (“The time has come to recognize virtual property in the courtroom, at least in
disputes between users, in order to encourage secondary market trades and innovative
business models.”); Westbrook, supra note 42, at 781 (“[A]n understanding of property
theory suggests that property rights in virtual goods are bound to be recognized or created
gradually as society increasingly depends on such rights.”).
Treating virtual items as property would not create a new form of property.  As such,
it would not violate the common law’s restriction on the creation of new forms of property
rights. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (“In the common law,
the principle that property rights must conform to certain standardized forms has no name.
In the civil law, which recognizes the doctrine explicitly, it is called the numerus clausus—
the number is closed.”).
62 See Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1096 (“Ownership of a book is not ownership of the
intellectual property of the novel that the author wrote.”).
63 See John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule:  Are Software
Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (explaining that neither selling nor
donating book he bought would violate publisher’s copyright).  That is because, under cop-
yright law, the possessor of a copy is entitled to transfer the copy even though that pos-
sessor does not own rights to make and distribute further copies. Id. at 11–12; see also 17
U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by
such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”).
64 See Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1096 (“[O]wnership of virtual property does not
threaten the intellectual property interest held by the creator of the property.  It protects
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Under this approach, a game player’s virtual property rights in an
item held by his avatar—such as, say, a (hypothetical) Cloak of Sor-
cery—rest neither on the copyright that the world’s owner may have
in the Cloak nor on rights in physical assets such as the various com-
puters that allow players to participate in the world.65  Instead,
Professor Fairfield’s approach would give the player property rights in
the copy of the Cloak of Sorcery that would be analogous to the rights
that I have in my copy of The Matrix.66  His theory would provide
protection for someone whose virtual assets are misappropriated or
destroyed by a hacker,67 without eliminating the intellectual property
rights of the game owners.68
B. Property in Game Worlds:  The Role of the EULA
Although the distinction between virtual property and intellec-
tual property is logical, it is too soon to tell whether courts will recog-
nize virtual property rights as such.  Even if they do, it is uncertain
who courts will determine owns virtual property.  Many games contain
agreements between virtual world owners and participants that pur-
port to allocate all of the virtual property to the owners.  This Section
discusses the enforceability issues that such provisions raise in the
context of game worlds, where they are likely to be especially
restrictive.
the interests of the purchaser of the object.  An owner of virtual property owns the same
rights that the owner of a book does.”).
For a work to be subject to copyright, it must, among other things, “be ‘fixed’ or
embodied in some material object, such as ink on paper (books) . . . orientations of dipoles
on magnetic media (audio tapes, videotapes, floppy diskettes, flash memory), or pits and
lands on optical media (CDs, CD-ROMs, DVDs).”  Rothchild, supra note 63, at 8–9.  The
physical embodiment of a virtual sword, for example, is the code on a computer server.
See Miller, supra note 31, at 448 (“[T]he fixation requirement would offer no hurdles here,
because the code would be maintained in internal storage on the server.”).  Each rendering
of the sword is a copy of that code.
65 See Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1078 (“[I]n my conception the power of an owner
persists over the use of the virtual property regardless of the system or chattel currently
connected to it.  If I own a building in a virtual world, I own it regardless of the intellectual
property inherent in the underlying code.”); see also Blazer, supra note 61, at 152 (“[B]y
recognizing an interest in virtual property, service providers do not give up ownership and
control of any computers storing the virtual property.”).
66 See Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1096 (“[R]ecognition of virtual property rights does
not mean the elimination of intellectual property.  The owner of virtual property does not
own the right to copy it.”).
67 See id. at 1081 (“[C]laims of theft of virtual property cannot be properly resolved by
laws designed to fortify chattel rights in individual computers. . . . Thus, without a theory of
virtual property, owners of such property are left without an effective remedy.”).
68 See id. at 1096 (“[R]ecognition of virtual property rights does not mean the elimina-
tion of intellectual property. . . . An owner of virtual property owns the same rights that the
owner of a book does.”).
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Game companies address the rights and obligations of themselves
and players with an array of agreements, including End User License
Agreements (EULAs) and Terms of Service Agreements (TOS).69
These often state that the game owner does nothing more than license
the use of the game to the player.70  If that limitation is effective, the
player may not own even a copy of a virtual item.71  Instead, the
player would have the right to use the copy for the license period,
subject to various restrictions provided in the license agreement.72  By
analogy, if I were to rent a DVD of The Matrix Reloaded from a video
store, I would not own it.  As a result, I would face restrictions on the
use I could make of it.
The use of “license” terminology in game agreements favors
game owners.  Licensing a copyrightable item, such as software or a
DVD, attempts to remove hallmarks of ownership from the possessor,
69 See Jankowich, supra note 3, at 5 (“[P]rivate systems of regulation governing virtual
worlds . . . are typically contained in EULAs, terms of service[,] . . . rules of conduct,
posting policies, and naming policies . . . .”).
70 For example, WoW’s EULA provides, in part:
Subject to your agreement to and continuing compliance with this License
Agreement, Blizzard hereby grants, and you hereby accept, a limited, non-
exclusive license to (a) install the Game Client on one or more computers
owned by you or under your legitimate control, and (b) use the Game Client in
conjunction with the Service for your non-commercial entertainment purposes
only.  All use of the Game Client is subject to this License Agreement and to
the Terms of Use agreement, both of which you must accept before you can
use your Account to play the Game.
World of Warcraft, End User License Agreement § 1 (last updated Feb. 2, 2007), http://
www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/eula.html.
71 See Balkin, supra note 48, at 2070 (“Platform owners . . . can write the EULA to
state that no player should have any expectations of property rights in any virtual items or
features of the game [and] that game owners may destroy, remove or modify virtual items
at the platform owner’s sole discretion . . . .”); Amy Kolz, Real Virtuality, AM. LAW., Dec.
2004, at 38, 38 (“Most game developers, such as Electronic Arts Inc. and NCsoft Corpora-
tion, insist that all tools and characters created in digital worlds belong exclusively to the
company.”).
Treating these agreements as the primary source of parties’ rights and obligations
raises the conceptual issue of how the rights and responsibilities of various players vis-a`-vis
one another are determined. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/
Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 776–77 (2001) (“[C]ontract rights are in per-
sonam; that is, they bind only the parties to the contact [sic]. . . . Property rights, on the
other hand, are in rem—they bind ‘the rest of the world.’”); see also Fairfield, supra note
10, at 1092 (“Contracts only allocate costs and benefits between the parties to the contract.
Property law balances the benefits of personalized transactions against the search costs
imposed on third parties seeking to purchase such resources.”).
72 This approach remains consistent with the distinction between intellectual property
and a copy of the item that incorporates that intellectual property. See supra notes 62–64
and accompanying text.
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thereby limiting the possessor’s right to transfer that item.73  This
poses a potential problem:
Shrinkwrap licenses commonly prohibit licensees from transferring
or assigning their particular copy of the software.  Such provisions
conflict with the “first sale” doctrine in copyright law, which gives
the owner of a particular copy of a copyrighted work the right to
dispose of that copy without the permission of the copyright
owner.74
Yet, “[c]ourts, commentators, and the Copyright Office have . . .
accepted the software publishers’ argument that since they only
license their software, and do not sell it, they retain ownership of the
software . . . .”75
It is nonetheless possible that courts will look beyond the license
terminology used in EULAs.  For example, a receipt from a parking
garage that classified the arrangement as a license of a parking space,
so as to limit liability for damage to the car, might nonetheless be
treated by a court as a bailment, giving the car owner the benefit of a
presumption that any damage was caused by the bailee’s negligence.76
Indeed, courts would have several factors on which to base rul-
ings in favor of players.  Players will likely argue that EULAs are not
individually negotiated but rather provide boilerplate language to
which players must consent in order to play.77  Many are “click-wrap”
agreements to which players assent by clicking on a button but which
73 Rothchild, supra note 63, at 3–4 (discussing how designation of buyer as “licensee” is
one device software companies use to prevent buyers from becoming owners of copies of
product); Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License?  Contracting Around Stat-
utory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 103 (2006) (“If the
chattel is licensed rather than sold, the first sale doctrine does not apply.”).
74 Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1268 (1995) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988)).  The “first sale” doctrine gives a copy-
right holder control over the first sale of a copy (such as a book or DVD) but not over
subsequent sales of that copy.  Rothchild, supra note 63, at 9.
75 Rothchild, supra note 63, at 28.
76 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 71, at 814 & n.129 (citing Allen v. Hyatt Regency-
Nashville Hotel, 668 S.W.2d 286, 288–90 (Tenn. 1984) (classifying parking garage arrange-
ment as bailment entitled to presumption of negligence, rather than as license)); cf.
McGlynn v. Parking Auth. of Newark, 432 A.2d 99, 102–05 (N.J. 1981) (considering stan-
dard of care and applying presumption of negligence rather than “outmoded” concept of
bailment).
77 See Jankowich, supra note 3, at 5, 7 (describing use of click-wrap agreements and
prospective players’ inability to negotiate with virtual world proprietors over governance
systems).  Game companies do get feedback about EULA provisions, however. See Julian
Dibbell, OWNED!  Intellectual Property in the Age of eBayers, Gold Farmers, and Other
Enemies of the Virtual State (2003), available at http://www.juliandibbell.com/texts/
owned.html (“[T]he EULA for a game like EverQuest . . . was effectively renegotiated on
a daily basis.”).
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they may not necessarily have read.78  EULAs also tend to be highly
protective of game owners, to the detriment of players in their
capacity as consumers.79  In addition to purporting to limit players’
property rights in virtual items and prohibiting real-market trade,
EULAs may provide that the game owner retains all of the intellec-
tual property rights in the content of the world, including players’
avatars, in-world items, and even storylines and avatars’ names.80
However, EULAs and click-wrap agreements have become stan-
dard practices,81 and have been enforced in at least one case involving
computer games.82  Game owners also have legitimate reasons for
trying to retain control over their games.  First, the principal way they
retain players is by providing a good gaming experience, including
78 Jankowich, supra note 3, at 5 (“Click-wrap agreements are a common contractual
format in software whereby agreements appear on-screen and the participant must either
agree or disagree to the terms before advancing to the next screen.”); Westbrook, supra
note 42, at 803 (“Sony and Blizzard, the behemoths of the Western MMORPG scene, both
require users to agree to a ‘click-wrap’ end-user license agreement . . . .”).
79 See Jankowich, supra note 3, at 9 (“The . . . contracts that govern virtual worlds are
the products of owners and lawyers engaging in a centralized process of lawmaking
through a form of nonnegotiated, infinitely modifiable, proprietor-friendly regulation that
I call ‘EULAw.’”). This is not surprising given the fact that these are agreements between
a world owner with a large amount at stake and multitudes of individual users, each with a
much smaller amount at stake. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 1, at 50 (“Since the
EULAs are written by the corporate owners, their terms inevitably grant all rights to the
owner of the world.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 463 (“EULAs are written by corporate
attorneys to protect corporate interests in corporate products; any alleged benefit to con-
sumers is merely secondary to the protection of corporate concerns . . . .”); cf. Merrill &
Smith, supra note 71, at 804–05 (discussing how “a singular entity on the one side of the
transaction” may exploit information asymmetries to detriment of large class of people on
other side).
80 Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1083–84.  Even within highly scripted virtual worlds, such
as WoW, a player may create a story, such as a legend surrounding his avatar, and feel
entitled to exploit it.  The game owner, by contrast, may wish to be able to use the game’s
content without infringing participants’ copyrights, perhaps for promotional purposes, or
to be able to reap the rewards of licensing the avatar to the makers of a television show.
See Jankowich, supra note 53, at 217 (discussing hypothetical in which owner of world
wishes to license popular, player-created character to television studio).
81 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass
Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335, 342–44
(1996) (“The uniform terms of EULAs facilitate high-volume distribution without the cost
of individually negotiating individual licenses. . . . Although EULAs are most likely ‘con-
tracts of adhesion,’ they are neither unusual nor pernicious. . . . In reality, a negotiated
contract is atypical in the mass market context . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
82 See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (enforcing EULAs of
computer games distributed by Blizzard Entertainment on CD-ROM that required users to
click button labeled “I Agree” in order to install game against defendants who reverse-
engineered Blizzard’s service for multiplayer online use of games). But cf. Bragg v. Linden
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (refusing to enforce arbitration
clause in Second Life’s TOS, finding it both substantively and procedurally
unconscionable).
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interesting content and an evolving world.  Keeping a game capti-
vating, especially for high-level players, requires the frequent addition
of new content and modification of existing code.  Otherwise, a
“world would become stale, dated, dominated by exploits and its
gameplay would become completely disjointed.”83  Yet, new or
altered content may threaten the value of in-game assets (whether
earned in-game or purchased).
As a simple example, if a sword added to a game, say the Sword
of Mischief, turns out to be more powerful than intended—thus
making content that was supposed to be challenging quite easy—the
game’s publisher may decide to reduce the Sword’s effectiveness.84  In
that situation, players who have acquired the Sword may resent its
loss of power.85  However, game designers would not be able to fix
coding errors and keep their worlds interesting and challenging if such
changes required the permission of all affected players.
Second, because it takes substantial time to develop new content,
game designers also try to control the pace at which a player can pro-
gress through the game.86  A player who experiences everything that
one virtual world has to offer may move on to another.  Many game
companies make much of their revenues from monthly subscriptions,
so it is in their interest to require new players to devote the months of
“grinding” required to build a high-level avatar.  In addition, a mea-
83 Bartle, supra note 8, at 27.  “In the realm of online games, an exploit is usually a
software bug, hack or bot that contributes to the user’s prosperity in a manner not
intended by the developers.” Exploit (online gaming) , in WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exploit_%28online_gaming%29 (last visited Aug. 22, 2007); see also
James Grimmelmann, Virtual Power Politics 7 (Apr. 19, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=707301 (“Calling some-
thing an ‘exploit’ is a way of saying that you want the software changed to prohibit it and
that you think those who are taking advantage of it are cheating.”).
84 See Computer and High Tech Law Journal Symposium Rules & Borders—Regulating
Digital Environments:  February 11, 2005:  Panel 3—Ownership in Online Worlds, 21
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 807, 823 (2005) [hereinafter Ownership in
Online Worlds] (discussing how game owners would want to diminish effect of overly pow-
erful weapon); Westbrook, supra note 42, at 807 (arguing that developers should be free to
diminish power of in-game objects when “doing so [is] required in order to maintain an
ordered virtual environment”).
85 See Westbrook, supra note 42, at 789 (“[N]erfing has lead [sic] to a number of dis-
putes between users and developers in the past, particularly when a substantial sum of real
money has been exchanged for a powerful weapon, only for the purchasing user to find
that the developer has removed its most desirable characteristic.”).
86 See Ondrejka, supra note 2, at 97 (“[D]evelopers have converged on two approaches
to stretching developed content:  shards and instantiated spaces. . . . [W]hile these tech-
niques extend the life of content, the users continue to rapidly consume existing content
and to demand more.”).
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sured pace to the game supports the ethos of a hero’s journey.87
Moreover, if some players find shortcuts to higher achievement, other
players may feel the level they achieved has been devalued, leaving
them dissatisfied with the game and inclined to turn elsewhere.88
It is thus generally preferable, from the game publisher’s perspec-
tive, to require players to work through content to achieve status and
for avatars’ levels actually to reflect players’ achievements in the
game.89  Accordingly, for games such as WoW, which are not designed
to be commodified, game owners often attempt to prohibit real-
market trade in virtual items because of the effect that such transac-
tions have on the game.90
In any event, the mere belief by game players that they have—or
should have—property rights91 does not necessarily mean that they
do,92 and the mere fact that they may act like property owners by, for
example, selling certain items, does not necessarily mean that they
87 Cf. Bartle, supra note 8, at 30–31 (“In those virtual worlds set up to guide players
along their hero’s journey, the notion of achievement is critical to success.  Players must
feel that that they are advancing, that the advancement is worthwhile, and that there is
some definite goal that indicates they have ‘won.’”).
88 See id. at 40 (discussing negative impact that market in valuable objects can have on
other players’ views of one’s accomplishments); cf. Westbrook, supra note 42, at 788
(“[S]ome gamers (as well as developers) have argued that allowing avatars and items to be
bought and sold is unfair in that it allows well-heeled but inexperienced players to bypass
the time-consuming and sometimes repetitive game play that is normally required to
achieve success and stature within the game.”).
89 See Bartle, supra note 8, at 41 (“As a virtual world designer, I do not want my
players to have their sense of achievement trashed . . . . I therefore seek to prevent players
from buying and selling in the real world characters and objects from my virtual world.”);
Grimmelmann, supra note 83, at 5–6 (“[I]t seems as though the natural instinct of the game
designer would be to pander . . . . But this instinct runs up against players’ desire for
challenge and scarcity. . . . Designers are stingy with players because players themselves,
especially other players, demand overall stinginess.”).
90 See Jankowich, supra note 3, at 39 (“56.25% of the virtual worlds surveyed pro-
hibit[ed] sales of virtual property outside of their world.”); see also Bartle, supra note 8, at
36 (“The accumulation of out-of-context sales . . . does make a difference.  Unchecked,
eventually it tips the scales and the virtual world flips from being a hero’s journey world to
being a world with no hero’s journey.  The game conceit has gone.”).  The “game conceit”
is the players’ “agree[ment] to abide temporarily by a set of rules which limits their
behavior (i.e., restricts their freedom), in exchange for which they gain whatever benefits
the game offers.” Id. at 23.  Professor Bartle, who designed the first multiuser domain, id.
at 20–22, lists the game conceit among the three “fundamental characteristics” of virtual
worlds, id. at 34.
91 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 1, at 37 (“Participants in virtual worlds clearly
see their creations as property.”).
92 See id. at 50 (“The Blacksnow Interactive case was the first dispute over virtual prop-
erty to make it to the real-world court system, but it is unlikely to be the last.  Disagree-
ments between the corporate-wizards and the player-avatars are seemingly inevitable.”
(footnote omitted)).  The Blacksnow litigation was dropped after the plaintiffs failed to pay
their lawyers. DIBBELL, supra note 12, at 28.
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are.  A bailee, such as a museum borrowing and displaying a painting,
may appear to be the owner.93  The museum could try to exploit that
perception by attempting to sell the painting, but that would not make
it the rightful owner, nor would it make the sale legitimate.94
Yet, where a single party with more information drafts an agree-
ment and presents it to numerous parties, each with much less at
stake, and in circumstances in which bargaining over the terms is not a
realistic option, courts may be inclined to protect the group with less
at stake.95  In particular, courts may deem provisions in these types of
agreements to be unenforceable if they overly favor the drafter.96
Professor Fairfield has argued that a provision claiming that the
game’s publisher owns all of the game’s virtual property is oppres-
sive.97  It remains to be seen whether courts will agree.98
C. Property in Second Life and Other Unscripted Worlds
Generally, publishers of unscripted worlds have less desire for
restrictions on virtual property than publishers of game worlds do
because unscripted worlds do not hinge on a hero’s journey.  As
Professor Bartle has argued, “[w]hat is acceptable in a virtual world
for which the designers have opted out of supporting the hero’s
93 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 71, at 818 (“[I]t is not implausible that in many
cases—for example where a museum allows a gallery to exhibit a painting of which the
museum is merely a bailee—there is a problem of ostensible ownership.”).
94 See id. at 812 (“One concern is that bailees may take advantage of this confusion
[regarding ownership] to convert the bailor’s property.”).
95 See id. at 806–07 (arguing that courts are likely to employ “protection strategy,” such
as using default rules as equalizer, when stakes are low for each of numerous parties on
one side of relationship).
96 See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson, supra note 81, at 345 (“[M]ost users are better
served by relying on . . . the contract principle that agreements should be construed against
the drafter . . . .”); see also Balkin, supra note 48, at 2070 (“[A]greements [governing vir-
tual worlds] may not be enforceable in all cases, especially if courts—and, more impor-
tantly, legislatures—think that people are being taken advantage of and believe that
important property interests are at stake.”).  Recently, a federal district court refused to
enforce the arbitration clause in Second Life’s TOS because it found the TOS to be a
contract of adhesion, the arbitration provision “buried,” and “the TOS . . . substantively
unconscionable.”  Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606–07 (E.D. Pa.
2007).
97 See Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1083 (“These provisions surpass the usual abuses of
contracts of adhesion.  By means of contract, virtual environment holders currently parlay
their (legitimate) claim to the intellectual property in an environment into an illegitimate
claim to all of the virtual property possessed by or developed by the inhabitants of the
environment.”).
98 See Bartle, supra note 8, at 41–42 (“Sellers may seek to strike down ‘oppressive’
restrictions embodied in EULAs and administrative practices.  Perhaps they will be suc-
cessful?” (footnote omitted)).  The effect that resolution of this issue may have on tax
liability is discussed in Part III infra.
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journey is not necessarily acceptable in one for which they have
not.”99
More specifically, in unscripted worlds, owners do not need the
level of control required to regulate a character’s advancement in a
structured story or to maintain balance in a game.  Accordingly, while
permitting real-money purchases of items in game worlds may
threaten the game conceit,100 doing so in an unscripted world does
not.  It is precisely because such worlds lack the structure and
storyline of game worlds that real world trade can enhance the experi-
ence.  Thus, unscripted worlds may actually seek to foster real-market
trade.
Second Life is an example of such a world, and it offers a particu-
larly interesting case study because it does not claim any intellectual
property rights in its participants’ creations.101  In fact, the world’s
mechanics allow a participant who creates an item and transfers it to
another participant to decide whether to permit or prohibit that par-
ticipant from copying or transferring the item.102  However, Second
Life takes a different approach to the items it provides in the virtual
environment, such as land and Lindens, the world’s currency.  The
TOS provides participants with permission to use the “‘textures’ and/
or ‘environmental content’ that are both (a) created or owned by
Linden Lab and (b) displayed by Linden Lab in-world.”103  The TOS
also provides for limited rights in Lindens, granting users “a limited
license right governed solely under the terms of this Agree-
ment . . . .”104  The TOS does not address land specifically; its legal
status is currently unclear.105
99 Bartle, supra note 8, at 41.
100 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
102 See Second Life, Knowledge Base, Content Creation, Permissions, http://support.
secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptID=4417&task=knowledge&questionID=4087
(last visited Oct. 6, 2007) (instructing Second Life residents on how to set permissions on
object).
103 Second Life, Terms of Service Agreement, supra note 50, § 3.4.  A portion of the
Second Life TOS was overturned by the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, which found that “the arbitration clause is procedurally and substan-
tively unconscionable” and not susceptible to “bluelining” “to remove an element that
renders it substantively unconscionable.”  Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d
593, 611–12 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
104 Second Life, Terms of Service Agreement, supra note 50, § 1.4.
105 The status of land is the subject of a pending lawsuit. See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at
613 (denying both motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and motion to compel arbitra-
tion).  One of Mr. Bragg’s allegations is that Second Life advertised that participants would
have ownership rights in land they purchased. Id. at 596 & n.6.  In a memorandum and
order denying the motion of Linden Research, Inc., to compel arbitration, the court stated
that “[a]lthough it is not the only virtual world on the Internet, Second Life was the first
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Thus, the Second Life TOS implicitly attempts to create different
types of property, expressly recognizing substantial rights only in
residents’ own creations.  However, unlike game worlds, which typi-
cally restrict real-market trade, Second Life does not ban sales of vir-
tual items for real money.106  In fact, Second Life offers an in-world
exchange, the LindeX, to facilitate the exchange of Lindens into U.S.
dollars and vice versa.
The question of whether Second Life’s TOS will be interpreted to
mean that participants do not have property rights in virtual items is
important for determining the tax consequences of exchanges within
Second Life because, as is the case for game worlds, the federal
income tax questions turn partly on whether participants are trans-
acting in property.  These tax issues are discussed in the next Part.
III
DO VIRTUAL WORLDS GIVE RISE TO REAL
TAX LIABILITIES?
The thriving market in virtual world items means that readily cal-
culable values, in U.S. dollars, exist for myriad virtual items.  Many
virtual world participants never sell a single item.  Still, a tax problem
may arise, even for them, because “all the wands and gold pieces that
are not traded, but remain forever within the ‘fantasy’ world, also
have economic value.”107  If virtual items constitute property for fed-
eral income tax purposes, their receipt may be income,108 and their
disposition, even in an in-world trade, may be taxable.109  To make the
tax issues concrete, consider two fictional taxpayers, one who plays
WoW110 and another who is a Second Life “resident.”111
and only virtual world to specifically grant its participants property rights in virtual land.”
Id. at 606.
106 Thus, regardless of whether participants have a time-limited use right, Second Life’s
provision of a license would not violate the Copyright Act’s “first-sale” rule. See supra text
accompanying notes 72–75.
107 Edward Castronova, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Real-Money Trade in the Products of
Synthetic Economies, 8 INFO 51, 52 (2006).
108 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 2006) (including in income many receipts); I.R.C. § 74
(West 2006) (including in income prizes and awards).
109 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (including in income gains from dealings in property); I.R.C.
§ 1001 (West 2006) (providing for calculation of gain or loss on disposition of property).
110 WoW is used as the example of a MMORPG because of its dominance among sub-
scription-based MMORPGs. See Seth Schiesel, An Online Game, Made in America, Seizes
the Globe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at A1 (“World of Warcraft . . . [has] almost seven
million paying subscribers . . . . Almost every other subscription online game . . . measures
its customers in hundreds of thousands or even just tens of thousands.”).
111 Second Life is used as an example of an unscripted world because of its prominence
and because it allows participants to retain intellectual property rights in their creations.
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Ava is an information technology professional who spends about
twenty hours each week playing WoW, for which she pays a license
fee of $15 per month.  She plays purely for entertainment, socializing
online with gamer friends.  She never purchases or sells WoW items,
avatars, or accounts for real money.  Over the past six months, she has
participated in numerous “raids,” receiving items worth a total of
$1000.  Moreover, she has traded—for in-game items or virtual cur-
rency (gold)—items that she has found or “looted.”  The traded items
have an aggregate value of $500.  Should Ava report as income on her
federal income tax return:  (1) the computer-generated items she has
received from her raids, (2) her profits from selling items in-game for
gold, and (3) her profits from in-game trades of virtual items for other
virtual items?
Ben is a dentist who spends about ten hours each week in Second
Life, where he has his “second home,” a virtual house.  Ben pays $10
per month for his account.112  Ben’s avatar has an array of furniture
and a nice wardrobe.  Ben makes some of the clothing for his avatar,
including T-shirts that he sells to other participants’ avatars in
exchange for Lindens.  It costs him nothing but time to make copies of
the T-shirts and he has received Lindens worth $500 from those sales
this year, although he has not converted them to U.S. dollars.  Should
Ben report the value of the Lindens as income?
The question of whether and when these two taxpayers should be
taxed is not easy to answer.  Each taxpayer has received something of
value.  Should it matter that the items are only “virtual”—that they
have no corporeal existence?  Moreover, should there be a distinction
for tax purposes between the receipt of Lindens, which can be
exchanged for U.S. dollars, and the receipt of virtual items or currency
in a structured game like WoW, where real-money trades are prohib-
ited but nonetheless occur?  To answer these questions, this Part dis-
cusses the tax law applicable to receipts of items and exchanges, in the
context of longstanding doctrine and its application to in-world trans-
actions.  In the last Section, this Part also considers a policy analysis of
the tax issues presented by virtual worlds and the changes to tax law
suggested by policy considerations.
112 With his premium account, Ben also receives 300 Lindens each week.  If Lindens are
not property, they are part of the service Ben purchases with his monthly fee, just as drops
are if they are not property. See infra text accompanying note 114.  If Lindens are prop-
erty, they should constitute a partial return of his $10 and thus not be taxable.
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A. The Taxation of “Loot Drops”
The taxation of loot that is obtained upon defeat of an enemy is a
problem that game worlds present that unscripted worlds generally do
not.  At a high level, there are two ways of conceptualizing “loot
drops”113 for tax purposes:  Either they are a type of property or they
are not.  If they are not property, they should not constitute income
but rather should be considered part of the game service provided to
players in return for their monthly fee.114  The user fee allows use of
all of the items available to the player in the game, including copies
that are not generated until a certain event happens—such as the
defeat of a monster, who drops previously nonexistent loot.  More-
over, if the legal system ultimately treats players as receiving mere
limited licenses to use those copies, as opposed to ownership of
them,115 then the same analysis should apply.
Further analysis is required, however, if drops constitute property
owned by players.116  Receipts of property are often taxable.  Section
61 of the Code defines gross income quite broadly, to include “all
income from whatever source derived . . . .”117  Treasury regulations
further specify that “[t]reasure trove, to the extent of its value in
United States currency, constitutes gross income for the taxable year
in which it is reduced to undisputed possession.”118  A leading case
teaches that “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion” are included in gross income.119
In addition, “prizes and awards” are included in gross income by a
separate section, Code section 74.120  The remainder of this Section
considers the tax consequences if drops do in fact constitute property.
113 See Babylon, Item Drop, http://www.babylon.com/definition/Item_drop/English (last
visited Aug. 21, 2007) (“[A] drop is a tangible object in the game world that the enemy
possesses and ‘drops’ when it is defeated.”).
114 Other services provided for by the fee include access to the virtual environment and
an avatar (usually, one compiled or customized by the player). See Beth Simone Noveck,
Trademark Law and the Social Construction of Trust:  Creating the Legal Framework for
Online Identity, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1733, 1743 (2005) (“Players [in Everquest] can only
create characters using copyrighted software provided by the company.”).
115 See supra Part II.B.
116 Cf. Fairfield, supra note 10, at 1083–84 (arguing for recognition of virtual property).
117 I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 2006).  The federal income tax is imposed on a base of “taxable
income.” See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (West 2007) (listing tax rates imposed on individuals’ taxable
income); I.R.C. § 11 (West 2006) (listing tax rates imposed on corporations’ taxable
income).   Taxable income includes items of “gross income” and is reduced by deductions.
I.R.C. § 63(a) (West 2006).
118 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (as amended in 1993).
119 Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
120 I.R.C. § 74(a) (West 2006).
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1. What Drops Are Not
a. Imputed Income
Although most receipts constitute gross income, there are several
exceptions to income taxation in the Code, as well as certain well-
established, noncodified exclusions.  One possible basis for exclusion
of loot drops is that they might be “imputed income.”121  Professor
Joseph Dodge has described imputed income as follows:
The principal meanings, which overlap somewhat, appear to be:  (1)
the flow of satisfactions obtained by a taxpayer (which would
include not only the value of satisfactions derived from owning and
spending but also the value of leisure, sleep, a happy marriage, etc.),
and (2) the market-price equivalents of non-market economic
activity (such as the value of self-grown crops and the rental value
of self-owned assets, and possibly the value of self-performed
services).122
Thus, under the imputed income doctrine, no federal income tax is
levied on, for example, the rental value of owner-occupied housing.
Bryan Camp has argued that the imputed income doctrine applies
to loot drops because virtual world participants’ “activities are not
normal market transactions but represent self-provided services or, at
most, enjoyment of self-owned property.  The service provided is play
and the property is a right to play, a chose-in-action, a thing.”123
However, this does not provide the best conceptual fit.  Imputed
income is a relatively narrow category.  Professor Dodge explains
that:  “[W]indfall accessions to wealth [are not] ‘imputed income’ as
that term is usually used, i.e., in the sense of income from self-
provided services or self-owned personal-use assets.  Indeed, imputed
income, whether meaning a ‘flow of satisfactions’ or as ‘hypothetical
market income’ is distinct from material wealth.”124  Drops, unlike
typical imputed income, require the efforts of a third party (the game
publisher) in order for the taxpayer to receive them.  Moreover,
assuming that drops constitute players’ property, they increase
121 Camp, supra note 17, at 61.  Professor Joseph Bankman previously suggested that
the imputed income doctrine applies to virtual world transactions.  Daniel Terdiman, Are
Virtual Assets Taxable?, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 17, 2006, http://news.com.com/Are+virtual
+assets+taxable/2100-1043_3-6027212.html (“‘[T]he IRS . . . shouldn’t go after folks until
they sell the assets . . . . The common sense reason for this is that the ‘assets’ represent
enjoyment value—what we call imputed income.’” (quoting Joseph Bankman)).
122 Joseph M. Dodge, Accessions to Wealth, Realization of Gross Income, and Dominion
and Control:  Applying the “Claim of Right Doctrine” to Found Objects, Including Record-
Setting Baseballs, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 685, 691–92 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
123 Camp, supra note 17, at 61.
124 Dodge, supra note 122, at 705 (footnote omitted).
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players’ wealth.  For these reasons, they do not fit well under the
rubric of imputed income.125
b. Record-Setting Baseballs
If drops are players’ property, they may appear to be prizes, akin
to lottery winnings, or “found” items, like a twenty dollar bill on the
sidewalk.  Lottery winnings,126 game show prizes,127 and even old cur-
rency found in a piano purchased at auction128 are all taxable.  Yet it is
well known that some of the baseball fans who caught record-
breaking home run balls in 1998—some of which had values of $1
million or more129—were not taxed.
Initially, when queried by a sportswriter,130 an IRS spokesman
referred to the possibility that a gift tax could apply if a fan who
caught a ball promptly returned it.131  However, “[o]nce the IRS’ posi-
tion was made clear, public and congressional outcry came
quickly . . . .”132  Charles Rossotti, then-Commissioner of the IRS,
made a hasty retreat, announcing that neither income tax nor gift tax
125 This Article thus disagrees with Professor Camp’s argument that “using the concept
of imputed income is the best way to frame the issue of taxing . . . the loot drop in WoW
. . . . because [players’] activities are not normal market transactions but represent self-
provided services or, at most, enjoyment of self-owned property.”  Camp, supra note 17, at
61.
126 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 2006) (defining gross income as “all income from whatever
source derived”); Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 71, 107 n.88 (“Lottery winnings are also subject to at least federal
income taxes . . . .”).
127 See Jennifer M. Nasner, The Unexpected Tax Consequences of “Extreme Makeover:
Home Edition,” 40 GONZ. L. REV. 481, 482 (2004/05) (noting that “prizes and awards, such
as game show winnings and lottery prizes,” commonly bear federal income tax).
128 Cesarini v. United States, 428 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
129 See Darren Heil, The Tax Implications of Catching Mark McGwire’s 62nd Home Run
Ball, 52 TAX LAW. 871, 871 n.3 (1999) (“[Mark] McGwire’s 70th home run ball was
recently sold for over $3,000,000.  His 62nd was estimated before it was caught to be worth
at least $1,000,000.” (citing Ronald Blum, Comic Book Creator Has McGwire Ball, AP
ONLINE, Feb. 9, 1999, available at LexisNexis Academic, Associated Press Online collec-
tion; A.J. Cook, Before McGwire Clubbed His 62nd, IRS Dealt Its Image Even Bigger
Blow, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Sept. 21, 1998, at B3)).
130 Heil, supra note 129, at 871.
131 The events unfolded as follows:
As reported by MSNBC, on Mon., Sept. 7, after [Mark] McGwire had tied
Roger Maris’s home run record at 61, IRS spokesman Steven Pyrek said that a
baseball is owned by major league baseball until it leaves the field, after which
time it is owned by the fan who comes up with it.  Even if the fan were to
return the ball, “the giver is responsible for paying any applicable tax on any
large gift,” Pyrek reportedly said.
IRS Drops the Ball?, 17 TAX MGMT. WEEKLY REP. 1296, 1296 (1998).
132 Id.
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would apply to a fan who caught and promptly returned a baseball.133
A special bill to the same effect was introduced in Congress,134 though
it was never enacted.135  Representative Bill Thomas, who introduced
the bill, stated:
[R]ather than take the IRS at its latest word, I feel it necessary to
introduce this modest measure as a reminder that Congress is
keeping its eye on the IRS.  As we head down the baseball season
homestretch, this issue serves to illustrate why we need to tear the
IRS out by its roots with real tax reform.  Baseball fans and all
Americans should be free of abusive and absurd IRS intrusions into
their daily lives.136
Unfortunately, the treatment of record-setting baseballs provides
no help for loot drops.  Drops are not true windfalls, as discussed
below.137  Moreover, the absence of tax on certain record-setting base-
balls reflects an administrative decision by the IRS in the face of
public outcry—and that decision was limited to the context in which
the fan promptly returned the baseball in question.  It provides no
help with respect to the receipt of virtual items.138
2. The Proper Tax Category for Drops
Loot drops, which appear when players defeat monsters, require
substantial investments of time and effort on the part of players; thus,
they are not true windfalls.  Professor Dodge has argued convincingly
133 Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IR-98-56 (Sept. 8, 1998), available at
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-98-56.pdf.
134 See H.R. 4522, 105th Cong. (1998); IRS Drops the Ball?, supra note 131, at 1296
(“Rep. Bill Thomas (R-Calif.) Sept. 9 introduced a bill (H.R. 4522) specifying that a base-
ball fan who catches a home run ball and immediately returns it to the hitter would not be
subject to gift taxes.”).  During 1998, the Senate Finance Committee, chaired by William
Roth, was conducting hearings portraying the IRS as rampant with out-of-control agents.
Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 979
& n.46 (2003).
135 “After its introduction, the bill disappeared into the abyss of Congressional commit-
tees, never to be seen again.”  Jennifer A. Cunningham, Note, Are Frequent Flyer Benefits
Really Benefits?:  An Analysis of the Frequent Flyer Tax Debate and a New Theory of Taxa-
bility for Frequent Flyer Benefits, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 281, 297 (1999).
136 IRS Drops the Ball?, supra note 131, at 1296.
137 See infra Part III.A.2.
138 Similarly, the IRS’s treatment of frequent flier miles earned on business trips and
used for personal travel provides no help.  Frequent flier miles, which are not taxed, are a
personal benefit earned during business activity and are difficult to value.  Camp, supra
note 17, at 27.  Moreover, as with home run baseballs, the lack of taxation of miles is the
result of a nonprecedential administrative decision made in response to public outcry that
ensued after the IRS initially suggested that their receipt might be taxable. See Dominic L.
Daher, The Proposed Federal Taxation of Frequent Flyer Miles Received From Employers:
Good Tax Policy But Bad Politics, 16 AKRON TAX J. 1, 14–15 (2001) (noting that “[a]mid a
swift and severe public outcry” IRS changed its position only four days after its pronounce-
ment on status of frequent flier miles for employer reimbursement plans).
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\82-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 28 14-NOV-07 12:15
December 2007] TAXING VIRTUAL WORLDS 1647
that there is a distinction between found items—windfalls—and what
he calls “taken” items—those that require more effort to obtain.139
He also argues that “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between
‘taken’ and ‘self-created’ objects,” explaining that “[a] ‘self-created’
item is property produced by the taxpayer’s own personal efforts, as
opposed to the labor of others or with significant capital investment
. . . .”140  With respect to the taxation of taken and self-created prop-
erty, he concludes that “[b]oth categories of self-obtained property
are excluded from income when acquired, but the rationale for exclu-
sion might differ somewhat as between self-obtained business inven-
tory and self-obtained personal-use items.”141
Professor Dodge persuasively argues that self-created business-
use property, such as the art of a professional artist, and “taken”
business-use property, such as fish caught by a professional fish-
erman—both of which are inventory—do not constitute gross income
until disposed of because they reflect mere investment.142  He points
out that even the taxation of services performed for compensation
hinges on the compensation:  “Looking at the venture as a whole, the
actual obtaining of the inventory, by whatever techniques, is not an
139 Dodge, supra note 122, at 696.  He explains:
[F]ound objects (in tax talk) are thought of as acquired at random and without
special effort . . . , as “windfalls.”  Objects (including those that can be sold in
more or less their natural state, such as gold, gems, treasure, oil, fish, and
game) that are sought after and obtained as the result of a venture, activity, or
enterprise (that requires planning, financing, and implementation) are not usu-
ally referred to as “found.”  For want of a better term, I will use the word
“taken” to refer to in-kind property appropriated as the result of a commercial
venture or personal hobby, so as to connote the “active” posture of the tax-
payer relative to the “passive” posture of a taxpayer appropriating a windfall
found object.
Id.
140 Id.
Locke’s theory . . . grants property where the “labour makes the far greatest
part of the value of [the asset].” . . . Within the virtual-world context, one could
conclude that the player cannot claim property interests in the entire world but
might legitimately claim [property rights] in some smaller part—the virtual
castle, sword, or breastplate—in which his or her labor makes up the greatest
part of the value.
Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 1, at 47 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOV-
ERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 28 (Charles L. Sherman ed.,
Appleton-Century-Crofts 1937) (1869)).
141 Dodge, supra note 122, at 696.  Professors Lawrence Zelenak and Martin McMahon
agree that self-created property is not taxed until disposition. See Lawrence A. Zelenak &
Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Taxing Baseballs and Other Found Property, 84 TAX NOTES 1299,
1305 (1999) (“The exclusion of self-created property applies not only when the taxpayer
consumes the property, but also when the taxpayer simply holds the property—as with a
work of art, patent, or copyright.”).  My writing of this Article, for example, as valuable as
it may be, does not give me gross income.
142 Dodge, supra note 122, at 697.
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‘end’ but rather a ‘means’ (or opportunity) to earn a profit.  The sale
of the inventory, not the obtaining of it, is the realization event.”143
With respect to personal-use property, Professor Dodge notes
that crops a taxpayer grows and consumes are not taxed.144  He adds:
Similar considerations apply to “taken” personal-use property.
Here the analogy to imputed income from self-provided services is
less compelling, but there is still investment of capital and labor by
the taxpayer.  That such property is obtained by an investment that
is below the property’s fair market value is no reason to tax the gain
prior to realization.145
Virtual items received in drops resemble the “taken” property
that Professor Dodge discusses:  They require substantial effort on the
part of the taxpayer, but are not self-created items because they
depend on the substantial prior efforts of the game’s designers.  As
discussed above, taken items are taxed not on receipt but instead on
disposition, regardless of whether they are personal-use items or are
treated as business inventory.
Consequently, Ava, the WoW player, should have no gross
income from the drops she receives.  The same reasoning means that
someone who plays an online game as a source of income has no gross
income on receipt of the drops, either.  That person, however, will
usually cash out quickly in order to have the liquidity to purchase real
world items.  Both the players who sell their loot occasionally and the
income-seeking players, who typically will sell shortly after receipt,
will be taxed upon sale.146  The “player” who is actually working
online will thus not escape the imposition of tax upon his or her liveli-
hood, while the casual seller will owe tax only on actual sales.  Ava,
who never sells virtual items for real money, will not be taxed on her
fun, at least with regard to the drops she receives.
3. Basis in Drops
If a game player disposes of an item received in a drop, particu-
larly in a manner that is taxable, such as by selling it in the real
market,147 the player will need to know his or her basis in the item.148
143 Id.
144 Id. at 703.
145 Id.; see also id. at 704 (“In conclusion, there are reasonable arguments for the posi-
tion that, in a realization system, self-created (and taken) objects should not be treated as
giving rise to gross income until sale, etc.  That is certainly the rule of positive law.”).
146 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (West 2006) (defining gross income to include “[g]ains
derived from dealings in property”).
147 Sales in the real market are taxable.  I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a)–(c) (West 2006).
148 Basis typically tracks investment in property.  The Internal Revenue Code (Code)
provides:  “The basis of property shall be the cost of such property, except as otherwise
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Assuming that a player has no gross income on receipt of a drop,
there is no taxed amount to increase any basis149 that he or she would
have in a dropped item.  A player thus must have either a zero basis in
loot drops or a nonzero basis that reflects an allocable portion of the
user fees the player paid to participate in the virtual world.  However,
the monthly fee most accurately reflects a right to the use of the world
for that month.  Fees paid monthly are not the types of expenses that
normally must be capitalized (giving rise to basis) in the first
instance,150 because they relate to such a short period.151  Moreover, a
license fee is not normally allocable to property obtained with that
license.  By analogy, a taxpayer with a fishing license could not allo-
cate part of the cost of the license to the fish that he or she caught; the
license and fish are separate assets.152  Thus, assuming that players are
not taxed on the receipt of drops, it is more reasonable to treat players
as having a zero basis in them.
provided in this subchapter and subchapters C (relating to corporate distributions and
adjustments), K (relating to partners and partnerships), and P (relating to capital gains and
losses) . . . .”  I.R.C. § 1012 (West 2006).
149 If an item is taken into income, the taxed amount constitutes (or increases) basis.
This is known as “tax cost basis.” See Charles T. Terry, Capital Equipment Expensing:
Incremental Tax Reform for a Transition Realization-Based Income Tax, 7 FLA. TAX REV.
215, 227 (2006) (“[I]f a taxpayer receives equipment worth $100,000 as compensation for
services provided to his or her employer, the fair market value of the equipment becomes
the taxpayer’s cost basis in the equipment.”).
150 Expenses that are normally deductible must nonetheless be capitalized or included in
inventory costs in some contexts. See I.R.C. § 263A(a)(1) (West 2006) (providing that cer-
tain direct and indirect costs must be included in inventory costs or capitalized).  However,
§ 263A only applies to “[r]eal or tangible personal property produced by the taxpayer,”
I.R.C. § 263A(b)(1), and would not apply to virtual items, which are intangible.  Section
263A also does not apply “to any property produced by the taxpayer for use by the tax-
payer other than in a trade or business or an activity conducted for profit.”  I.R.C.
§ 263A(c)(1).
151 Cf. I.R.C. § 263 (West 2006) (requiring, in general, capitalization only for expendi-
tures resulting in permanent, not short-term, improvement of property); see also Ethan
Yale, When Are Capitalization Exceptions Justified?, 57 TAX L. REV. 549, 549 (2004) (“It is
a widely accepted general principle that a taxpayer should capitalize an expenditure that
produces a benefit lasting beyond the current tax period.”).  Although Treasury regulations
provide for a general rule of capitalization of amounts paid to acquire or create intangible
assets, Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(a) (2004), an exception is provided for:
[A]mounts paid to create (or to facilitate the creation of) any right or benefit
. . . that does not extend beyond the earlier of—
(i) 12 months after the first date on which the taxpayer realizes the right or
benefit; or
(ii) [t]he end of the taxable year following the taxable year in which the pay-
ment is made.
Id. § 1.263(a)-4(f)(1). Thus, license fees should not give rise to basis in a player’s account.
152 See FISHING INFORMATION NEWSLETTER (IRS), June 2002, at 2–5, available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/28fin_jun02.pdf (describing tax treatment of fishing permits).
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Allocating a portion of the monthly license fee to the drops
received would also make it difficult to determine a taxpayer’s basis in
individual virtual items sold, as the number of items acquired could
change even during the course of a single day.  It would require con-
stant, to-the-moment revaluation that is not practicable either for tax-
payers or the IRS.  Treating untaxed virtual property items obtained
in drops as having zero basis thus facilitates taxation of taxable dispo-
sitions of loot.153
B. Exchanges
1. Taxation of Real World Exchanges
In general, in an exchange, a taxpayer is taxed on the difference
between the value of property received and the taxpayer’s basis in the
property relinquished.154  For example, if Clyde trades a painting cur-
rently worth $1000, in which he has a $200 basis, for a desk also worth
$1000, Clyde has realized a gain of $800 ($1000 minus $200)155 and
will need to include all $800 of gain in his income for federal income
tax purposes.156
The reason that Clyde is taxed on $800 is because “[g]ains
derived from dealings in property” constitute gross income.157  The
Code further provides that the gain realized on the disposition of
property is the amount by which the “amount realized” exceeds the
property’s basis,158 and that the amount realized is “the sum of any
money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than
money) received.”159  A gain realized need not be recognized as
income for tax purposes, but the Code provides that it is recognized
unless a statutory exception applies.160
Limited classes of exchanges benefit from nonrecognition.  One
well-known example is the like-kind exchange.  In general, if “like-
kind” items, such as two parcels of land, are exchanged, a taxpayer
153 This approach would also eliminate any issue about whether virtual items that are
destroyed or stolen can be the subject of a casualty or theft loss deduction.  See I.R.C.
§ 165(a)–(c) (West 2006) (authorizing casualty and theft loss deductions for individuals,
capped at adjusted basis).
154 I.R.C. § 1001(a) (West 2006).
155 See I.R.C. § 1001(a)–(b) (amount realized is $1000 in “property (other than money)
received” minus $200 adjusted basis).
156 See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire
amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of prop-
erty shall be recognized.”).
157 I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (West 2006).
158 I.R.C. § 1001(a).
159 I.R.C. § 1001(b).
160 I.R.C. § 1001(c).
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who holds for business or investment purposes both the item relin-
quished and the item received benefits from nonrecognition of any
realized gain, except up to the amount of any non-like-kind property
received.161  However, there is no such protection for property put to
personal use, such as property used for entertainment or recreation.
The fact that the like-kind exchange provision exists does not
mean that a non-like-kind trade is necessarily taxed absent the appli-
cability of some other nonrecognition provision.  Rather, realization is
a threshold issue; in order for recognition (or nonrecognition) to
occur, there must first be a realization event.162  What constitutes a
realization event?  A Treasury regulation states that:  “Except as oth-
erwise provided in subtitle A of the Code, the gain or loss realized
from the conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of
property for other property differing materially either in kind or in
extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained.”163  Thus, for
example, an exchange of damaged stock certificates for replacement
certificates would not constitute a realization event because the prop-
erty exchanged is not materially different from the property received.
The Supreme Court has upheld this regulation.164  In Cottage Sav-
ings Ass’n v. Commissioner,165 the Court, applying its prior case law,
held that “[u]nder [its] interpretation of § 1001(a), an exchange of
property gives rise to a realization event so long as the exchanged
properties are ‘materially different’—that is, so long as they embody
legally distinct entitlements.”166  In that case, the Court found that a
taxpayer’s interests in a group of mortgage loans did “embody legally
distinct entitlements”167 from the interests in mortgage loans that the
taxpayer received in exchange “[b]ecause the participation interests
exchanged by Cottage Savings . . . derived from loans that were made
to different obligors and secured by different homes . . . .”168  The
holding allowed Cottage Savings to recognize a loss for tax purposes
even though the exchange was tax motivated.
In reaching its decision, the Court commented on previous cases
involving corporate reorganizations that had taken place prior to the
161 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1), (b) (West 2006).
162 See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (“The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall
be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section
1011 for determining gain . . . .” (emphasis added)).
163 Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1996).
164 See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1991) (“We conclude that
Treasury Regulations § 1.1001-1 is a reasonable interpretation of § 1001(a).”).
165 Cottage Sav. Ass’n, 499 U.S. 554.
166 Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
167 Id.
168 Id.
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enactment of provisions allowing for nonrecognition of certain reorga-
nizations.169  In those cases, the Court had held that a realization
event had occurred when a taxpayer exchanged stock in a corporation
incorporated in one state for stock in a successor corporation incorpo-
rated in another state, but that no realization had occurred where a
taxpayer exchanged appreciated stock in a corporation incorporated
in Ohio for stock in a successor corporation also incorporated in
Ohio.170  In discussing the holdings of those cases, the Cottage Savings
majority made clear that a change in the state of incorporation gave
rise to a realization because “a company incorporated in one State has
‘different rights and powers’ from one incorporated in a different
State”171 and thus differs in its legal entitlements.172
Thus, for the Supreme Court, entitlements conferred by law are
critical in determining whether exchanged properties are materially
different.  Where legal entitlements in the two properties differ, the
disposition constitutes a realization event and is taxable unless a non-
recognition provision applies.
2. Taxation of Game World Trades
a. Realization in Game Worlds Under a Virtual Property
Paradigm
Does an in-world exchange of virtual items in a game world con-
stitute a realization?  Assuming that players own the virtual property
held by their avatars, there is a strong argument that an exchange of
the virtual Sword of Mischief for the virtual Cloak of Sorcery, for
example, is a realization event, just as an exchange of a real sword for
a real cloak would be.  The intangible nature of the Sword of Mischief
and the Cloak of Sorcery would not pose a problem; intangible prop-
erty rights, such as lengthy leaseholds and copyrights, are recognized
169 Id. at 562–65.
170 See id. at 565 (“[S]eparate groups of stock . . . are materially different if they are
issued by different corporations . . . or if they confer ‘differen[t] rights and powers’ in the
same corporation . . . .” (second alteration in original)).
171 Id. at 564 (quoting United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 169–73 (1921)).
172 Id. at 565.
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as property for federal income tax purposes,173 and an exchange of
two intangibles can likewise constitute a realization event.174
Thus, if Ava is treated as owning the virtual Sword of Mischief
held by her avatar, her exchange of that sword for the virtual Cloak of
Sorcery, which she will subsequently own, does give her a legally dis-
tinct entitlement—just as an exchange of a real sword for a real cloak
would.  Accordingly, under a virtual property regime, Cottage Savings
would be of little help to a gamer hoping to avoid tax on in-game
trades.175
b. Realization in Game Worlds Under a License Paradigm
The analysis changes if courts determine that the right held by a
gamer like Ava is in fact only a license to use the items in the game
world.176  A license paradigm would give her and other similarly situ-
ated players a strong argument that their in-game trades are not tax-
able.  As an analogy, consider an exchange of a bookcase for a printer.
Assume that each item is worth $300.  Ordinarily, a taxpayer
exchanging the bookcase for the printer would have a $300 amount
realized.  However, the analysis is different if the taxpayer does not
own the bookcase and will not own the printer.  Assume that the tax-
payer is an employee, who, under the terms of an employment agree-
ment, is entitled to use various office equipment owned by his
employer.177  If the employee arranges with a fellow employee to
trade the bookcase in his office for a printer in the other employee’s
office, that is quite different from trading properties owned by those
employees.  The taxpayer has not really disposed of any asset, much
173 Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3) (2004) (“[S]eparate and distinct intangible asset
means a property interest of ascertainable and measurable value in money’s worth that is
subject to protection under applicable . . . law and the possession and control of which is
intrinsically capable of being sold, transferred or pledged . . . separate and apart from a
trade or business.”); id. § 1.1031(a)-1(c) (as amended in 1991) (“Examples of exchanges of
property of a ‘like kind.’ No gain or loss is recognized if . . . a taxpayer who is not a dealer
in real estate . . . exchanges a leasehold of a fee with 30 years or more to run for real estate
. . . .”). See generally id. § 1.263(a)-4 (providing general principle of capitalization of costs
of acquiring intangible assets).
174 See id. § 1.1031(a)-2(c) (as amended in 2005) (“An exchange of intangible personal
property of nondepreciable personal property qualifies for nonrecognition of gain or loss
under section 1031 only if the exchanged properties are of a like kind.”).
175 In that case, Congress should enact an exclusion for exchanges within game worlds
such as WoW. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
176 The governing agreements of many game worlds, such as WoW, provide that players
have a mere license to use the game and do not own the items in it.  See supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
177 This use right constitutes a license. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 745 (1998) (“Because it is only a license, my right to use the
office at the law school can be terminated by the university at any time.”).
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less received title to a different one.  Instead, what has occurred is a
relocation of certain items owned by the employer within the domain
controlled by the employer.
It is not the business nature of the setting in this example that
drives the analysis.  If vacationers on a cruise trade the use of deck
chairs of different styles, the analysis is the same.  The reallocation of
deck chairs by the vacationers is not a disposition of an interest in one
deck chair and the acquisition of an interest in another.  Rather, each
vacationer has a right to use any of the chairs in the public areas of the
cruise ship.  Redistributing possession among those with the usage
rights is not a disposition of property, even if some vacationers who
sleep late pay cash to others who rise early and claim all the chairs of
the most popular type.  Although the cash received by the early birds
is gross income,178 the exchange of the use of one chair for the use of
another is not a realization event.
For a disposition to constitute a realization for federal income tax
purposes, it must be a disposition of “property.”179  A license may not
necessarily constitute property,180 and even if it does, under Cottage
Savings, an exchange of properties is treated as a realization event
only if the properties exchanged reflect “legally distinct entitle-
ments.”181  There is at least an argument that a vacationer entitled to
use any deck chair on the cruise ship does not change legal entitle-
ments when he or she exchanges possession of one chair for posses-
sion of another.  The same is true for the employee granted the use of
a suite of office furniture.
178 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross
income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”).
179 See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (West 2006) (referring to “[t]he gain from the sale or other
disposition of property”).
180 See Merrill, supra note 177, at 730 (arguing that there is no property without right to
exclude); id. at 744 (“A use-right that does not rise to the dignity of a property right is
called a license.”).  However, other scholars explain:
The bundle of rights conception has spawned various formulations of property
incidents.  The most minimal formulation, and possibly most widely accepted,
enumerates the rights to use, exclude, and transfer as the constitutive elements
of property.  The most expansive one, compiled by Honore´, lists eleven inci-
dents as the contents of property, yet omits the right to exclude, which is con-
sidered by many as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property” or even its “sine qua non.”
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531,
587 (2005) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979); Merrill, supra note 177, at 730).
Federal income tax law looks to state law rights to determine whether something con-
stitutes “property” for federal income tax purposes. See supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
181 Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 566 (1991).
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The same analysis, then, should apply to Ava and other players of
online games, as long as they have a mere license to use the items
within the game world.182  If Ava either trades her Sword of Mischief
for a Cloak of Sorcery held by another avatar (or sells it for the
game’s currency), that should not constitute a realization event for
her, assuming that the license provisions of the applicable agreements
are upheld.
3. Taxation of Trades in Second Life
Second Life is designed to allow commerce.  Of course, sales of
real world property or services within Second Life are taxable under
current law, just as they would be if they happened elsewhere (such as
via eBay).183  The difficult question is how to tax transactions that do
not traverse the boundaries of Second Life.
An important feature of Second Life is that it allows users to
retain intellectual property rights in their creations.184  A Second Life
resident is thus entitled not only to transfer the original creation, but
to make and sell copies of it as well, as can the publisher of a novel.
For example, Ben, the Second Life resident discussed above, makes T-
shirts for avatars to wear and sells copies of them in exchange for
Lindens.  Second Life thus empowers the reaping of profits in a way
that game worlds typically do not.
182 A license is a right of use that does not include the right to exclude.  Professor
Thomas Merrill explains:
[W]hat is the defining difference between use-rights in the form of licenses and
use-rights that are considered nonpossessory property rights?  The difference
is that the holder of a nonpossessory property right can exclude others
(including but not limited to the grantor) from interfering with the exercise of
the use-right, whereas the holder of a license lacks such a right.  In other
words, the feature that makes nonpossessory property rights property is the
right to exclude others, and the right to exclude cannot be derived from the
right to use.
Merrill, supra note 177, at 744.
183 See generally I.R.C. § 61(a) (including in gross income all income from any source
unless otherwise provided in Subtitle A of Code).
184 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  By contrast, Entropia Universe, which,
like Second Life, is a commodified, unscripted world, provides in its EULA:
Virtual items will often have names similar or identical to corresponding phys-
ical categories . . . . Despite the similar names, all virtual items are part of the
System and MindArk retains all rights, title, and interest in all parts including,
but not limited to Avatars and Virtual Items; these retained rights include,
without limitation, patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret and other propri-
etary rights throughout the world.
Entropia Universe, End User License Agreement § 7, https://account.entropiauniverse.
com/pe/en/rich/5185.html (follow “EULA agreement” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15,
2007).
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Nonetheless, the property rights of Second Life residents are not
well defined.  Second Life’s TOS does not directly address the prop-
erty rights, if any, that participants have in the copies of their cre-
ations.  However, the TOS does say that, notwithstanding the
intellectual property rights they have in their own creations, partici-
pants do not “own any data Linden Lab stores on Linden Lab servers
(including without limitation any data representing or embodying any
or all of [their] Content).”185  Accordingly, assuming the TOS is
upheld, Ben may not own a copy of a T-shirt he created (even if he
owns the underlying intellectual property), as the copy is represented
by computer code on Linden Lab’s servers.
The Second Life TOS also explicitly grants residents a mere
license to use copies of others’ creations; it provides that “by submit-
ting your Content to any area of the Service, you automatically
grant . . . to Linden Lab and to all other users of the Service a non-
exclusive, worldwide, fully paid-up, transferable, irrevocable, royalty-
free and perpetual License . . . to use your Content for all purposes
within the Service.”186  If a court finds that Ben has no property rights
either in copies of a T-shirt he creates or in a copy of a pair of jeans
created by another resident, a trade of one for the other should not be
a taxable event.  Instead, such a swap would resemble the exchange of
the Sword of Mischief for the Cloak of Sorcery in a game world under
a legal regime in which EULA provisions that grant players mere
licenses are upheld.187  If, on the other hand, Second Life residents
actually have ownership rights in copies of Second Life items, these
trades will fall within section 1001 of the Code and, absent an exclu-
sion, will be taxable.188
Sales of copies of creations for Lindens present distinct issues.  In
the scenario in which such copies constitute property, an exchange for
Lindens appears to give rise to legally distinct entitlements under Cot-
tage Savings189 and thus to taxation.  The TOS is restrictive regarding
Lindens; it grants participants “a limited license right governed solely
under the terms of this Agreement”190 and specifies that users “agree
that Linden Lab has the absolute right to manage, regulate, control,
185 Second Life, Terms of Service Agreement, supra note 50, § 3.3.
186 Id. § 3.2 (emphasis added).
187 See supra Part III.B.2.b.
188 In that case, Congress should enact a nonrecognition provision.  A trade of a copy of
a virtual T-shirt for a copy of a virtual pair of jeans suggests consumption rather than
commerce, just as trades within game worlds do. See infra Part III.C.2.
189 Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 566 (1991).
190 Second Life, Terms of Service Agreement, supra note 50, § 1.4; cf. Joseph M. Dodge,
Zarin v. Commissioner:  Musings About Debt Cancellations and “Consumption” in an
Income Tax Base, 45 TAX L. REV. 677, 678 (1990) (“Although Zarin [a casino gambler]
\\server05\productn\N\NYU\82-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 38 14-NOV-07 12:15
December 2007] TAXING VIRTUAL WORLDS 1657
modify and/or eliminate such Currency as it sees fit in its sole discre-
tion . . . .”191  A license to use property may not constitute property
for federal income tax purposes.192  However, even if a use right in
Lindens does not constitute property, the disposition of an item that
does constitute property, for which Lindens are received in return,
should constitute a realization event193—just as an exchange of prop-
erty for services would.194
Accordingly, if Ben sells a copy of a T-shirt for Lindens, then—
assuming that the copy of the T-shirt constitutes property—it appears
Ben has downgraded his legal entitlements to a more limited right of
use, giving rise to a realization event.  As such, any gain would be
includible in income195—even though Ben did not obtain cash in the
transaction.196  In fact, the same tax result would obtain even if
Second Life residents were granted ownership rights in Lindens.  In
that case, the exchange would resemble traditional barter:  the
exchange of ownership of one chattel for ownership of another.  In
other words, the exchange would still give rise to distinct legal
entitlements.
If copies of creations are not players’ property but are treated as
merely held by players, their exchange for Lindens, provided under a
limited license, may not be taxable.  Although it may be the case that
participants have even more limited rights in Lindens than in copies of
acquired tangible property, the chips, the chips were not property in the relevant tax sense
because they were only a ‘local’ medium of exchange, like currency or banknotes.”).
191 Second Life, Terms of Service Agreement, supra note 50, § 1.4.
192 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
193 Nonetheless, the transfer of the Lindens should not be taxed. See infra Part
III.C.2.b.
194 Cf. Gregg D. Polsky, A Correct Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Contingent
Attorney’s Fee Arrangements:  Enough with the Fruits and the Trees, 37 GA. L. REV. 57, 110
n.246 (2002) (“[A] transfer of property in exchange for services constitutes a realization
event.”).
195 Ben might not actually end up being taxed, however, if his Second Life expenditures
exceed his Second Life income. See infra text accompanying note 232.  Any taxable gain
will be capital in nature unless it falls within an exception in I.R.C. § 1221(a).  For example,
if the participant runs a business in Second Life and the items sold are inventory, they will
not constitute capital assets. See I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (West 2006) (excluding inventory
from definition of capital asset).  Whether or not a loss on a transaction in Second Life
(such as the sale of a T-shirt for Lindens) is deductible will depend, in the first instance, on
whether the user is participating in Second Life as a profit-seeking activity or merely for
entertainment. See I.R.C. § 165(a), (c) (West 2006) (stating that individuals’ losses, other
than casualty losses, generally are only deductible if incurred in transactions undertaken
for profit); I.R.C. § 183(b) (West 2006) (authorizing certain deductions from activity not
engaged in for profit).
196 Cf. Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100, 101 (providing that cash-method members of
barter club had income from services in “the taxable year in which the credit units are
credited to their accounts”).
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their own creations, a transfer of a copy does not fall within Code
section 1001 if it does not constitute property, which would mean that
Cottage Savings would not apply.
To summarize, transactions amounting to mere reallocations of
possession of items in which all participants have use rights do not
constitute realization events, and thus are not taxable.  If Second Life
residents are ultimately treated as owning (rather than merely
licensing) these items, lawmakers should consider exempting these
noncurrency exchanges from income recognition, as discussed further
below.  By contrast, an analysis of federal income tax law suggests that
sales of items for Lindens will be taxable unless courts treat partici-
pants as having property rights neither in their own creations nor in
Lindens.  Yet even in that case, the sale of items for Lindens should be
taxed as a matter of policy, as discussed in the next Section.197
C. Policy Issues in the Taxation of Virtual Worlds
The tax policy concerns usually considered in evaluating the
appropriateness of a tax or provision are equity, efficiency, and
administrability.198  That is, in general, a tax system or tax provision
should be equitable, result in minimal deadweight loss, and be pos-
sible for the government to implement and enforce.199
Equity includes both the notion of horizontal equity (taxing simi-
larly situated taxpayers similarly) and vertical equity (taxing those
with more income more than those with less income).200  The income
tax generally calls for inclusion in income of profits from personal,
business, and investment activities, and that should remain the case
whether the profit arises online or offline.  Similarly, the principle of
horizontal equity suggests that an activity that would not bear federal
197 Note that a Second Life resident who spends more on Second Life than he or she
earns in Second Life likely will owe no federal income tax on the sales because the expend-
itures will be deductible from the income earned in Second Life. See infra text accompa-
nying note 232.
198 See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax
Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 865 (2002) (stating that equity, efficiency, and
simplicity are traditional tax policy objectives); Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case
Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 732 (2003) (“[T]he three traditional cri-
teria for evaluating a tax [are] equity, efficiency, and simplicity . . . .”).
199 See Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, Administering the VAT, in VALUE ADDED TAXA-
TION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 171, 179 (Malcolm Gillis et al. eds., 1990) (“[T]ax admin-
istration is tax policy.”).
200 See Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1200 (1989) (“The first, horizontal equity, requires the equal
treatment of equals.  The second, vertical equity, calls for the unequal treatment of une-
quals.” (footnotes omitted)).
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income tax if engaged in offline should not bear federal income tax if
undertaken online.
As a general matter, it is inappropriate under an income tax to
impose a tax directly on consumption because, given that the funds
spent on that consumption were not deductible,201 taxing the con-
sumption value would effectively tax the activity twice.202  Because
this is true for activity engaged in offline, online consumption should
be treated the same way to avoid violating the principle of horizontal
equity.  Thus, in general, online activity generating a profit should
bear taxation, while that which generates mere entertainment value
should not.
Finally, although administrability may be thought a less lofty goal
than efficiency and equity, a system that cannot be enforced is not
workable (and may be inequitable and inefficient).203  Certain core
aspects of our tax system rest on foundations of administrability; for
example, the Supreme Court has stated that “the concept of realiza-
tion is ‘founded on administrative convenience.’”204
1. Drops
A policy analysis of the taxation of loot drops suggests that they
should not be taxed on receipt.  With respect to equity, if federal
income tax were imposed on drops, it would likely be regressive in its
impact—that is, a violation of vertical equity.  People who devote
more time to a game generally will receive more drops and thus owe
more tax if drops are taxed.  Those who spend more time in-game are,
by and large, likely those with more leisure time—given the
demographics of game players, particularly students, the underem-
ployed, and people between jobs—many of whom will thus have
lower incomes than those with less time to spend in-game.205
201 See I.R.C. § 262(a) (West 2006) (disallowing deduction for personal expenses); see
also Dodge, supra note 190, at 680 n.18 (“[T]he consumption from a consumer durable is
fully taxed ex ante when the asset is purchased since the purchase price is not
deductible.”).
202 See Dodge, supra note 190, at 680 n.18 (“Even under the income tax, consumption
generally is taxed once, although investment income may be taxed twice.”).
203 See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps:  The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=979602 (“[Although a] simple or easily administered tax may even seem like a
luxury[,] . . . administrability of a tax is key to its effectiveness . . . .”); see also Camp, supra
note 17, at 22–25 (discussing aspects of tax administration).
204 Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940)).
205 The Daedalus Project:  The Psychology of MMORPGs, Occupational Status, Marital
Status, and Children, http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/000550.php (last visited
Aug. 18, 2007) (“Overall, 50% of MMORPG players are working, 22% are full-time
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A tax on the receipt of virtual loot would also face adminis-
trability issues because it would be difficult to enforce.  Virtual loot is
not very liquid, not least because of prohibitions on its sale.  A player
selling loot risks losing his or her game account—and thus all
remaining loot.  Moreover, a rare item that might have great value if
sold separately may not be separately tradeable; it may “bind” to the
avatar.206  That makes valuation difficult and also precludes selling
simply that item to pay a tax that accrued on its acquisition.  It would
also be difficult for players to track and value every drop, particularly
because drops entail receipts, not dispositions.  Moreover, taxpayers
would likely perceive as oppressive the imposition of income tax on an
entertainment activity not resulting in the receipt of actual cash, par-
ticularly with respect to games that prohibit real-market trades.207
The illiquidity and compliance difficulties, combined with the
inequity and resentment taxpayers likely would perceive in taxation of
in-world transactions, would threaten the voluntary tax system.  Tax-
payers would also have little incentive to invest the time needed to
comply, considering the low odds of audit208 and the difficulty that the
IRS would have in countering their defense of minimal in-game
income.  The reaction to taxation would likely be particularly strong if
courts did not invalidate the EULA provisions that prohibit sales of
virtual items, because such a tax would encourage real-market
transactions.
students, 12% are working and/or going to school part-time, 10% are unemployed, 3% are
home-makers, while 1% are retired.”)  The median age of gamers is twenty-six, and
approximately twenty-five percent of gamers are teenagers.  The Daedalus Gateway:  The
Psychology of MMORPGs, Player Demographics, http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/
gateway_demographics.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2007).
Although the average amount of time players spend per week in virtual worlds is just
under twenty-two hours, see The Daedalus Project:  The Psychology of MMORPGs, Hours
of Play Per Week, http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/archives/000758.php (last visited Aug.
15, 2007), “over 11% spend[ ] a full workweek (30–40 hours) developing their online char-
acters, and 8-10% spend[ ] more than 40 hours per week,” Viktor Mayer-Scho¨nberger &
John Crowley, Napster’s Second Life?:  The Regulatory Challenges of Virtual Worlds, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 1775, 1782 (2006).
206 See supra note 44.
207 Gamers tend to vociferously oppose the prospect of taxation in this context. See,
e.g., Posting of detnos to CNET NEWS.COM, Talk Back, IRS Taxation of Online Game
Virtual Assets Inevitable, http://news.com.com/5208-1043_3-0.html?forumID=1&threadID=
23256&messageID=283667&start=-1 (June 27, 2007, 17:13 PDT) (objecting to taxation of
items acquired in WoW that, in poster’s mind, are “fictitious”).
208 See James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters:  Old “Brine” in New Bottles,
55 TAX L. REV. 135, 161 (2002) (“The Service’s shockingly low audit coverage makes the
audit lottery an irresistible attraction; it is not even a lottery, but rather a virtually sure
thing.” (footnote omitted)).
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Enforcement of such a law would therefore be difficult unless the
IRS imposed reporting requirements on game owners.209  Currently,
there are no such requirements.210  There is a movement, though, to
require information reporting on Internet auctions by expanding the
definition of a “broker” for information-reporting purposes to include
Internet auction sites.211
Although the games run on computer servers, tracking transac-
tions for information-reporting purposes would require coding beyond
that needed for game purposes.  Game owners are likely to resist
having to produce information reports, particularly because of the dif-
ficulty that tracking drops and trades would pose:
“That would be an apocalypse for developers,” said Matt Mihaly,
CEO of Iron Realms, which publishes such online games as
“Imperian” and “Lusternia.” “I think it would make running (mas-
sively multiplayer online games like “EverQuest” or WoW) an
unprofitable business to be in, except for the biggest publishers.
We’d spend all of our time tracking deals between players.  I don’t
know how we’d deal with the fact that we’re creating wealth every
time a monster makes a drop, or there’s a reward.”212
209 Amounts subject to information reporting experience much higher compliance than
amounts not reported to the IRS. See Charles P. Rettig, Nonfilers Beware:  Who’s that
Knocking at Your Door?, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Oct.–Nov. 2006, at 15, 15–16 (“Amounts
subject to third party information reporting, but not to withholding . . . have a . . . net
misreporting percentage of 4.5 percent. . . . Amounts not subject to withholding or infor-
mation reporting . . . [have] a much higher net misreporting percentage of 53.9 percent.”).
210 See INFO. REPORTING PROGRAM ADVISORY COMM., SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-
EMPLOYED SUBGROUP REPORT 1–2 (2006) (recommending use of information reporting
by auction sites such as eBay), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2006_irpac_
public_meeting.pdf; cf. I.R.C. § 6045(a) (West 2006) (“Every person doing business as a
broker shall, when required by the Secretary, make a return . . . showing the name and
address of each customer, with such details regarding gross proceeds and such other infor-
mation as the Secretary may by forms or regulations require with respect to such busi-
ness.”); I.R.C. § 6045(c)(1) (defining “broker” to include “(A) a dealer, (B) a barter
exchange, and (C) any other person who (for a consideration) regularly acts as a mid-
dleman with respect to property or services”).
211 See Dustin Stamper, IRS Wants Legislation To Require Auction Web Sites To Collect
TINs, 113 TAX NOTES 725, 725 (2006) (“‘We know that currently there are no information
reporting requirements for this industry,’ [Kevin] Brown [Commissioner of the IRS Small
Business/Self-Employed Division] said. ‘We also agree that legislative changes are needed
to broaden the scope of section 6045 to include information reporting for online auction
brokers.’”); cf. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION’S FISCAL YEAR 2008 REVENUE PROPOSALS 65 (2007), available at http://
www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/bluebk07.pdf (proposing information-reporting
requirement for brokers of tangible personal property applicable to “customer[s] for whom
the broker has handled 100 or more separate transactions generating at least $5,000 in
gross proceeds in a year”).
212 Terdiman, supra note 121.
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By contrast, taxing real-market sales of dropped items solves the
liquidity and valuation problems, creates no appearance of inequity,
and would be easier to track—both because of the smaller volume of
such transactions and because sales involve a flow of funds.  Policy
analysis thus supports the analysis of tax doctrine above.213
2. Exchanges
a. Trades in Game Worlds
With respect to exchanges within game worlds, policy analysis
suggests the same results as for drops—application of a cash-out prin-
ciple.214  As is the case for drops, taxing game-world exchanges would
be regressive and thus would violate the principle of vertical equity.
That is because people who spend more time playing a game more
typically will engage in more in-world trades.  As a result, players with
the most leisure time (many of whom, such as students, have less
income than those who have less leisure time) would tend to be taxed
the most.215
In addition, those with comparatively low basis in their virtual
property would owe more tax on exchanges of virtual property and
sales for virtual currency.  People who purchase property for cash
would tend to have higher bases in their items, particularly if trades
were taxed but drops were not, because if drops were not taxed, there
would be no “tax cost basis” aspect to them.216  Higher-income
players, who are likely to invest more real money in their game play,
would owe comparatively less tax on their in-game exchanges.217  Fur-
thermore, as with drops, it would be difficult for players to track and
213 See supra Part III.A.2.
214 See supra Part III.C.1.
215 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
216 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
217 Sony’s study of the first year of Station Exchange noted that “[t]he average active
Station Exchange buyer is 32 years old.  This is much older than the average age of [Ever-
Quest II] players overall, which is 25 years old.”  NOAH ROBISCHON, SONY ONLINE
ENTERTAINMENT STATION EXCHANGE:  YEAR ONE 7 (2007), available at http://www.
gamasutra.com/features/20070207/SOE%20Station%20Exchange%20White%20Paper
%201.19.doc.  It further found that “34-year-olds spent the most money on virtual goods,”
id., and “33- to 37-year-olds dominate in total dollar spending,” id., but, with respect to
selling, although the 33–37 age group is very active, “22-year-olds lead with $45,000 in total
sales this year,” id. at 8.  The paper hypothesizes that a “likely reason” for these findings is
that “18- to 22-year-olds have more free time to spend playing the game, and thus gath-
ering virtual goods to resell.  Older players, on the other hand, have less time to devote to
the game but more disposable income to use for buying the virtual goods they need in
order to advance.” Id.
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value every in-game trade, and players would likely resent taxation of
in-game exchanges that are part of the game’s entertainment value.218
Because the recognition of virtual property rights for players
would put them at risk of being taxed on purely in-game swaps,
lawmakers should consider creating a nonrecognition rule for such
exchanges.  To be sure, the general rule taxing barter transactions is
an important backstop to the tax system.219  Barter in the context of a
game such as WoW, however, is not a substitute form of commerce.  It
is consumption-oriented, rather than profit-oriented.  As discussed
above, from a policy perspective, it is not appropriate under an
income tax to impose a tax directly on consumption.220  A cash-out
rule has the convenient feature of allowing ready identification of
profit-motivated transactions in games that are designed with player
entertainment, not player profit, in mind.
A cash-out rule also accords with administrability concerns.  As
explained above, the government’s ability to administer the tax system
underlies the realization doctrine.221  The doctrine addresses the
important problems of valuation and liquidity that taxpayers would
routinely face in the absence of such a requirement.222  In fact, both
taxpayers and the government would face valuation issues under an
accretion-based tax,223 and “[t]he realization requirement also helps
prevent taxpayers from being required to sell assets in order to raise
funds to pay tax.”224
With respect to game worlds, liquidity issues would arise if purely
in-game transactions were taxed, as discussed above.225  In addition,
218 See supra text accompanying note 207.
219 See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization:  Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism,
and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 873 (1997) (“[R]ealization
must be defined to include property exchanges in order to deprive barter of any tax advan-
tage and thus channel taxpayers back into cash transactions.”).
220 See supra text accompanying notes 201–02.
221 See supra text accompanying note 204.
222 The realization doctrine does not perfectly resolve the problems of valuation and
liquidity, however. Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recogni-
tion Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1992).
223 See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991) (“Under an apprecia-
tion-based system of taxation, taxpayers and the Commissioner would have to undertake
the ‘cumbersome, abrasive, and unpredictable administrative task’ of valuing assets on an
annual basis to determine whether the assets had appreciated or depreciated in value.”
(citation omitted)); see also David M. Hasen, A Realization-Based Approach to the Taxa-
tion of Financial Instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397, 399 (2004) (“Some have pushed for an
accretion-based tax system or approximation to it under which economic gains and losses
are reckoned annually without regard to disposition . . . .”).
224 Deborah L. Paul, Another Uneasy Compromise:  The Treatment of Hedging in a
Realization Income Tax, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 40 (1996).
225 See supra text accompanying note 206.
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although many virtual items have readily ascertainable values,226
others that trade less frequently or reflect the value of a bundled set of
items—such as avatars sold with their equipment—may not.  Values
also fluctuate, sometimes significantly, and, unlike publicly traded
stocks, there are no published daily values of virtual assets, except
some virtual currencies.  Historical auction results, unlike stock prices,
may not always be readily available.  Furthermore, the values
involved, unlike stock in many closely held companies, for example,
usually would not justify the expense of an expert appraisal.  More-
over, failing to treat an in-game trade as a realization event does not
eliminate forever the possibility of taxation.  Rather, it postpones tax-
ation until the participant cashes out.  Thus, virtual worlds do not pre-
sent a “now or never” problem.
The values underlying the realization requirement thus support
the notion that in-world trades should not be considered to be realiza-
tions.  However, the fact that “[t]he realization requirement produces
several social costs”227 should also be considered.  Professor Deborah
Paul has identified these costs as:  (1) the lock-in effect that results
from a disincentive to sell appreciated property, (2) inefficiencies
resulting from the use of “hedges”228 as a way to avoid the effects of
lock-in, (3) the favoritism of capital over labor—and thus of relatively
wealthy taxpayers, and (4) reduced voluntary compliance if taxpayers
perceive the nontaxation of unrealized appreciation on capital as
unfair.229
The costs of the realization requirement that Professor Paul iden-
tifies are likely to be minimal with respect to virtual property in game
worlds.  In most games, taxpayers are not entitled to sell virtual items,
so there is already a disincentive to sell them.  If real-market sales or
exchanges constitute realization events but in-game trades do not, the
disincentive to sell game assets for cash will be compounded.  That
result both is in line with the preferences established by game owners
in their agreements with players and would have the benefit of not
taxing those participating purely for entertainment value.  It is also
extremely unlikely that players would use hedges to reduce any lock-
in effects in virtual property.
226 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 1, at 38 (“[O]ne can now establish reliable U.S.
dollar prices for various virtual-world properties. . . . In The Sims Online, the most popular
asset for sale on eBay is currency; one million simoleons will set you back about $180.”
(footnotes omitted)).
227 Paul, supra note 224, at 40.
228 See id. at 3 (“A taxpayer may hedge an asset by obtaining a derivative financial
instrument whose value varies inversely with the value of the asset.”).
229 Id. at 40–41.
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A rule that in-game trades, unlike real-market sales or exchanges
of virtual items, do not constitute realization events would favor cap-
ital over labor with respect to real-market transactions (because
profits would be lower on assets purchased for cash or other real con-
sideration).  However, it would do so far less than a law that taxed
transactions occurring within the game.  Taxing in-world transactions
would impose a disproportionately high burden on those investing rel-
atively high amounts of time but not money in the game.  Taxing only
real-market transactions would eliminate taxation on an enormous
number of transactions involving labor, as it would only tax those that
involve the receipt of real world items, such as cash.
Finally, with respect to voluntary compliance, taxpayers are more
likely to regard as unfair the taxation of purely in-game transactions
than the imposition of a rule that treats only real-market transactions
as realizations.  In fact, imposing tax on in-game transactions is likely
to be largely unenforceable, absent information reporting.230  Given
the number of participants and transactions, it would raise serious vol-
untary compliance issues.  The policies underlying the realization doc-
trine thus support the notion that a cash-out principle should apply for
exchanges in game worlds, including exchanges for virtual currency.
b. Trades in Second Life
As the discussion above reveals, unscripted worlds like Second
Life differ fundamentally from game worlds.  That doctrinal analysis
suggests that, if Second Life’s TOS is upheld, certain in-kind swaps
should not be taxed, but sales for Lindens should be.  These results
accord with tax policy because they would not tax entertainment but
would tax commerce.
Trades of copies of items, such as Ben’s trade of a virtual T-shirt
for a virtual pair of jeans, are likely to be focused on improving the
user’s experience, not on profit, because there is little profit margin to
be gained in obtaining a single copy of an item in what typically is an
arm’s-length exchange.  These item swaps that do not involve Lindens
therefore should not be taxed.  Such transactions pose little threat to
the tax system, and taxing them would pose serious issues of
administrability.
If courts determine that participants have ownership rights in vir-
tual items in which the TOS purports not to grant property rights, that
would create a tax issue even for those who participate in Second Life
purely for entertainment, unfortunately.  Thus, if virtual items become
230 Information reporting poses administrative difficulties and is likely to be resisted by
game owners. See supra text accompanying note 212.
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virtual property owned by virtual world participants, lawmakers
should consider providing nonrecognition for these types of swaps, as
well as for trades within game worlds.
In contrast with the hypothetical exchange of a copy of a virtual
T-shirt for a copy of a virtual pair of jeans, trades for Lindens may or
may not be profit-oriented.  A participant who regards Second Life as
a game may use Lindens as a medium of exchange,231 selling some
items and buying others, so as to better equip his or her avatar.
Another participant, though, may create a business in Second Life,
selling copies of items for Lindens in an effort to earn money.
From a policy perspective, the right result is not to tax mere
entertainment but to tax profit.  Making sales for Lindens taxable
does that because only net profit is subject to federal income tax.  A
Second Life resident who spends a lot, building up a rich realm online,
while also selling copies of creations that partially subsidize those
expenditures, will owe no federal income tax on the sales because the
Code allows a taxpayer to deduct expenditures in a hobby up to the
amount of income from that hobby.232  The net result, for example, if,
in a particular year, Ben, the dentist, spent $800 on purchasing Second
Life items for his avatar, and also earned $500 from in-world sales of
copies of his virtual T-shirts, would be that he would have no gross
income from his Second Life sales.
Of course, it would be possible to treat Second Life like a game
world, not taxing until cash-out transactions in which Lindens are
received.  Some might argue that a cash-out rule in Second Life would
best distinguish the profiteers from the players, much as a cash-out
rule does for game worlds.  There are two problems with that
approach.  First, as a doctrinal matter, profits are taxable even on non-
business activities, such as hobbies.233  Second, unlike most game
worlds, Second Life is intentionally designed to provide a platform for
commerce.  The permissible and easy exchange of Lindens for dollars
makes Lindens much more liquid than game-world currencies.234
That liquidity gives rise to tax avoidance opportunities.
231 Cf. Dodge, supra note 190, at 678 (referring to “‘local’ medium of exchange” in
context of casino chips).
232 I.R.C. § 183(b) (West 2006).
233 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 2006) (defining “gross income” extremely broadly); I.R.C.
§ 61(a)(3) (including in gross income gains from dealings in property, without regard to
nature of those gains).
234 Because Second Life encourages commerce by its users, it has an incentive to strive
to maintain the stability and liquidity of its currency. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV.
469, 488 (1987) (“The best argument for how Delaware has been able to retain its domi-
nance [in the competition for corporate charters] is that it offers a reliable promise—one
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For example, a taxpayer could accept Lindens in return for ser-
vices or sales of real world items.235  Those transactions would clearly
be taxable; there is no argument that a real world item a taxpayer
owns provides the same legal entitlements as Lindens.  However, it
would be hard to enforce payment of taxes on those transactions if
sales of virtual items for Lindens were untaxed, because it would be
hard for the government to detect which Linden transfers are for real
world items and which are for virtual ones.
The scope of the enforcement problem would likely grow precip-
itously if the government declared an intent not to tax the exchange of
virtual items for Lindens.  Second Life has already attracted signifi-
cant investment.236  The prospect of tax-free commerce would likely
accelerate that trend and give businesses an incentive to accept
Lindens as a form of electronic payment, particularly given the likely
misunderstanding about which sales for Lindens were truly tax-
exempt.
As small businesses open or add Lindens to the forms of payment
they accept, the likely confusion about the ambit of the tax exemption
would result in some unintentional noncompliance, particularly by
small businesses without a professional tax advisor.  For example, a
company might sell website-design services online and believe that by
accepting Lindens for something other than a tangible product, its
income would not be taxable, despite the fact that federal income tax
law taxes income from services regardless of the form of payment.237
A company that sells within Second Life a product deliverable online,
that cannot be matched by its competitors—that its corporation law will remain highly
attractive to managers in the future.”).  For a discussion of Second Life’s management of
the LindeX, see Grace Wong, How Real Money Works in Second Life, CNNMONEY.COM,
Dec. 8, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/12/08/technology/sl_lindex/index.htm.
235 VTOR (Virtual to Reality), a site for advertising for real and virtual goods, accepts
and prefers Linden dollars (Lindens).  VTOR, http://www.vtoreality.com/advertising (last
visited Aug. 10, 2007).  Federated Media (FM), an advertising company, also accepts
Lindens.  New World Notes (Mar. 31, 2006), http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2006/03/
meeting_lovisa.html (“After explaining to the FM staff how easy it is to convert L$ to US$
and then transfer that to their Paypal account, they gamely assented to take Linden Dol-
lars in lieu of currency.”). The online store Second Life Boutique had a section devoted to
“real life products.”  Stephen Totilo, Finally, You Can Buy Something Real with Play
Money , MTV, Jan. 19, 2006, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1521239/20060119/
index.jhtml.  In addition, Dynamedia Marketing and Pizza.Net reportedly partnered to
allow customers to order real world pizza in Second Life using Lindens.  Press Release,
Dynamedia Mktg., Pizza Enters the Virtual World of Second Life (Apr. 21, 2007), available
at http://www.fastpitchnetworking.com/pressrelease.cfm?PRID=8734.
236 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
237 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1960) (“Gross income includes income realized in any
form, whether in money, property, or services.  Income may be realized, therefore, in the
form of services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other property, as well as in cash.”); see
also Kerry Lynn Macintosh, How to Encourage Global Electronic Commerce:  The Case for
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such as software or music downloads, might similarly be mistaken
about tax liability.
If sales of virtual items for Lindens were untaxed, the enforce-
ment difficulties would also give rise to opportunities for intentional
tax evasion.  A taxpayer could, for example, set up a virtual shopping
cart in Second Life that appears to sell copies of a virtual item, with
information circulated outside of Second Life, perhaps by e-mail or on
a website, specifying what each virtual item represents in the real
world—the real item or service promised.  Of course, such a scheme
carries with it transaction costs, but the evaded taxes, especially on
high-priced items, might justify such costs for the seller.  Moreover,
the seller, by failing to pay the income tax due on such a transaction,
could reduce the price of the product by a portion of the taxes
avoided, thus undercutting compliant businesses.  Accordingly, failure
to tax this sector of the economy would likely result in an excessive
allocation of resources to it.238
The development of barter clubs in the 1970s provides an excel-
lent analogy to the likely development of Second Life under a regime
in which sales for Lindens are not taxed.  Although isolated barter
transactions between two individuals present a small enforcement
issue for the tax system, if the tax law is not enforced in this regard,
wide-scale barter exchanges that facilitate tax evasion can flourish.
Barter clubs typically use a form of credits as a medium of
exchange,239 allowing virtually any product or service to be traded for
any other without the use of cash240 through the use of what is essen-
tially a local currency.  At one time, these large-scale exchange organi-
zations posed a problem for tax enforcement:
The barter exchanges of 20 and 30 years ago boasted that they pro-
vided a way for business people to avoid taxes.  This aroused IRS
Private Currencies on the Internet, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 733, 790 n.215 (1998) (noting
that use of internet currencies does not preclude taxation under existing laws).
238 See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Com-
pliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1506 (2003) (“[S]ectors of the economy that provide a
greater opportunity for tax evasion may draw more investment than they would in the
absence of a tax system, potentially resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources.”).
239 See Rev. Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100 (describing use of “credit units” by barter club);
Robert I. Keller, The Taxation of Barter Transactions, 67 MINN. L. REV. 441, 480 (1982)
(describing use of “trade units” by barter clubs).
240 See, e.g., Baker v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1282, 1286 (1987) (describing barter club’s
accounting for, among other things, attache´ cases, computer paper, janitorial services,
Muzak services, silver bars, ski tickets, tires, and veterinary services); id. at 1287 (“The
operations manual petitioner received from Exchange Enterprises, Inc.[,] . . . suggests that
no more than two accountants, one architect, one artist, three auto body repair shops, two
bakeries, five electricians, three florists, and one insurance agent be allowed to join the
same barter exchange.”).
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interest, years of pitched battle, and finally legislation subjecting
barter exchanges to stringent reporting requirements.  Since 1982,
U.S. tax law has required barter exchanges to file reports on their
transactions with customers under section 6045 and to institute
backup withholding procedures for their customers under section
3406.241
The use of information reporting holds promise to foster compli-
ance on taxable transactions within unscripted worlds like Second
Life.  Like game companies,242 and even eBay,243 Linden Lab may
resist efforts to impose such reporting.  However, unlike game worlds,
Second Life does not involve loot drops, which may be hard to value.
Information reporting could require Linden Lab to track the Lindens
users receive from other participants and to report annual receipts of
any participant that aggregate in excess of a reporting threshold, such
as $600, using the LindeX for valuation.
One argument against such a reporting requirement is that it
might deter entrepreneurial activity in the form of start-up unscripted
virtual worlds.  A possible response would be to include in an infor-
mation-reporting law an exception for unscripted worlds under a cer-
tain size, in terms of income or value.  Tax evaders might be drawn to
the world lacking information reporting, but that would fuel growth
that should bring the world above the reporting threshold, allowing
the problem to correct itself.  Of course, start-up companies, antici-
pating this, would be well advised to design into the software the
ability to track transactions for information-reporting purposes, rather
than having to retrofit it later.
A conceptual problem that taxing sales for Lindens raises is how
to treat acquisitions that use Lindens as consideration.  If an exchange
of an item copy for Lindens is barter, then the person transferring the
Lindens would seem to face taxation as well.  Yet, spending of
Lindens resembles a purchase, which is not the occasion for taxation
241 Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Barter Transactions and the Tax Collector, 77
TAX NOTES 949, 949 (1997).
For some of the Congressional and IRS response to the rise of barter clubs, see Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 311(b), 96 Stat. 324, 600
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6045 (West 2006)); Rev. Rul. 83-163, 1983-2 C.B. 26; Rev.
Rul. 80-52, 1980-1 C.B. 100; Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60.  The government not only
instituted information reporting, but also began enforcement projects that included the
issuance of “John Doe” summonses to barter exchanges to find out the names of clubs’
members. See Keller, supra note 239, at 487–88 (“The Service has generally been suc-
cessful in enforcing its John Doe summonses against the Trade Exchanges.”).
242 See supra text accompanying note 212.
243 See Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Selling Stuff Online?  Here Comes the IRS,
CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 13, 2007, http://news.com.com/Selling+Stuff+online+Here+comes
+the+IRS/2100-1028_3-6176041.html (describing opposition of eBay and similar sites).
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under the federal income tax.  Moreover, those using Second Life for
entertainment purposes have little choice but to spend Lindens if they
wish to acquire additional virtual items.
Professor Robert Keller argued that “trade units” in large
national barter clubs should be treated “as a medium of exchange.
Under this approach, the goods and services acquired would be con-
clusively assumed to be equal in value to that of the trade units used
to acquire them.  Good deals and bad deals would simply be
ignored.”244  Professor Keller made that argument in the context of
barter clubs with trade units that do not fluctuate in value.  He
explained that for clubs with fluctuating units, gain or loss would be
recognized on the units’ use, and argued that “[f]or administrative
simplicity, taxpayers should determine gain or loss on the disposition
of a trade unit under a last-in-first-out (LIFO) method of identifying
the units disposed of.”245
Professor Keller’s approach to barter clubs with credit units that
do not fluctuate in value makes sense for Second Life.  Although
taxing the disposition of Lindens would more accurately reflect a tax-
payer’s economic profit, it would be at a cost of additional complexity
and substantial required recordkeeping.  Unlike the barter club mem-
bers Professor Keller discussed, which were businesses,246 at this
point, most Second Life residents are individuals.  Moreover, these
rules would spare those using Second Life purely for entertainment
from potentially onerous tax compliance burdens.  Taxing dispositions
of Lindens would impose an unnecessary drain on Second Life as an
entertainment vehicle while at the same time being difficult to
enforce—and no doubt extremely unpopular.
CONCLUSION
Should in-game receipts and profits from virtual trades be taxed?
Many people would likely respond that they should not be.  In fact,
the Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, Representative Jim
Saxton, has gone on record with that view.247  Virtual economies and
transactions within virtual worlds are not all the same, however.
There is a strong case from a policy perspective for not taxing in-game
receipts and trades within game worlds, including sales within those
games for virtual currency.  Game worlds typically focus on con-
244 Keller, supra note 239, at 500–01 (footnotes omitted).
245 Id. at 506.
246 Id. at 502–03.
247 Saxton Says Taxing Online Communities Would Be a “Mistake,” TAX NOTES TODAY,
Oct. 17, 2006, available at http://www.lexis.com (commercial electronic database requiring
registration) (enter “2006 TNT 201-21” in “Get by Citation”).
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quering challenges, not on commerce.  The real world value that exists
for in-game items as a result of trading by some players (often in a
gray market because such trade is banned by the game owner) should
not transform game-world successes into gross income.  Doing so
would raise serious concerns of equity and administrability.
By contrast, unscripted worlds that are designed to support com-
merce, such as Second Life, raise different issues.  Second Life
encourages its participants to make creations and sell copies of them
and facilitates those activities both by allowing participants to retain
their intellectual property rights in their creations and by facilitating
the conversion of Second Life’s currency, Lindens, into U.S. dollars.
Although Second Life has aspects that are game-like, and those
should not be taxed, it is also a platform, similar to eBay, that facili-
tates transactions online.  Failing to tax sales for Lindens would likely
give rise to the twenty-first century’s equivalent of barter clubs, fos-
tering both unintentional noncompliance and conscious evasion.  It
would also attract overinvestment in that sector of the economy.
The Second Life transactions that this Article argues should be
taxed do not raise the difficult valuation issues that game worlds do
for two reasons.  First, Second Life lacks “drops” of virtual items that
a player may receive but never sell.  Second, the LindeX tracks the
exchange rate of Lindens on a particular day, making the valuation of
Lindens (the currency received in a sale) fairly straightforward.  In
addition, because Second Life permits the exchange of Lindens for
U.S. dollars, Second Life participants do not face the same liquidity
problems that game-world participants do.  Taxpayers can exchange
Lindens for cash via the LindeX easily and with the blessing of Second
Life’s owner, Linden Lab.
It is not entirely clear that current tax law reaches all of the
results that this Article advocates, because it is not clear whether vir-
tual items are participants’ property.  Although recognition of prop-
erty rights for players would not change the tax result for loot drops
(which should be excludible under either paradigm), it would affect
the results for exchanges of virtual items.  If players are merely enti-
tled to use virtual items within a game, an exchange of those items
should not constitute a realization event.  However, if players win the
virtual property battle with game owners, then exempting from taxa-
tion both barter in game worlds and similar trades in worlds like
Second Life (that is, trades for virtual items other than currency) may
require legislation.  Laws along these lines, which neither tax mere
entertainment value nor open the door to tax evasion through virtual
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world transactions, will foster game-play without allowing commerce
to escape taxation simply because it is conducted in a particular venue
online.
